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The advisory service marketing recommendations used in this research represent the best 
efforts of the AgMAS Project staff to accurately and fairly interpret the information made 
available by each advisory service. In cases where a recommendation is vague or unclear, some 
judgment is exercised as to whether or not to include that particular recommendation or how to 
implement the recommendation. Given that some recommendations are subject to interpretation, 
the possibility is acknowledged that the AgMAS track record of recommendations for a given 
program may differ from that stated by the advisory service, or from that recorded by another 
subscriber. In addition, the net advisory prices presented in this report may differ substantially 
from those computed by an advisory service or another subscriber due to differences in 
simulation assumptions, particularly with respect to the geographic location of production, cash 
and forward contract prices, expected and actual yields, carrying charges and government 
programs.  ii 
Do Agricultural Market Advisory Services Beat the Market? 






The purpose of this report is to address two basic performance questions for market 
advisory services in wheat: 1) Do market advisory services, on average, outperform an 
appropriate market benchmark? and 2) Do market advisory services exhibit persistence in their 
performance from year-to-year?  Data on wheat net price received for advisory services, as 
reported by the AgMAS Project, are available for the 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 crop years.  
Not only do market advisory programs in wheat consistently fail to “beat the market,” their 
performance is significantly worse than the market.  On average, market advisory service 
performance is about $14 per acre below benchmark revenue, an economically non-trivial 
amount by any reasonable standard. The predictability results provide little evidence that future 
advisory service pricing performance can be predicted from past performance.   Do Agricultural Market Advisory Services Beat the Market? 
  Evidence from the Wheat Market Over 1995-1998 
 
  Farmers in the US continue to identify price and income risk as one of their greatest 
management challenges.  Using a survey of midwestern grain farmers, Patrick and Ullerich 
(1996) report that price variability is the highest rated source of risk by crop farmers. Coble, 
Patrick, Knight and Baquet (1999) survey farmers in Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska and Texas 
and find that crop price variability, by a wide margin, is rated as having the most potential to 
affect farm income.  Norvell and Lattz (1999) survey a random sample of Illinois farmers and 
show that price and income risk management rank second (following computer education and 
training) among ten business categories in which farmers identify needs for additional consulting 
services.  The desire for greater assistance with price and income risk management is not limited 
to large farms, as the proportion of farmers expressing this preference actually is highest for 
those operating medium-sized Illinois farms (500-999 acres).   
 
  Farmers view market advisory services as a significant source of market information and 
advice in their quest to manage price risks associated with grain marketing. In a rating of 
seventeen risk management information sources, Patrick and Ullerich (1996) report that the rank 
of market advisors and computerized information services is surpassed only by farm records.  
Schroeder, Parcell, Kastens and Dhuyvetter (1998) find that a sample of Kansas farmers rank 
market advisory services as the number one source of information for developing price 
expectations. Norvell and Lattz (1999) find that twenty-one percent of Illinois respondents 
currently use marketing consultants, and that such consultants tie for first (with accountants), in a 
list of seven, as likely to be most important to their business in the future.   
 
    Given the high value that farmers place upon market advisory services, it is somewhat 
surprising that only two academic studies investigate the pricing performance of advisory 
services.
1  The dearth of studies seems even more anomalous in light of the large number of 
studies on grain marketing strategies.
2  The lack of studies on market advisory services is most 
likely due to the difficulty in obtaining data on the stream of recommendations provided by 
services.  
 
Gehrt and Good (1993) analyze the performance of five advisory services for corn and 
soybeans over 1985-1989. Martines-Filho (1996) examines the pre-harvest corn and soybean 
marketing recommendations of six market advisory services over 1991-1994.  Most recently, 
Irwin, Good, Martines-Filho and Jackson (2000) investigate the performance of 25 advisory 
services in marketing corn and soybeans over 1995-1998. The evidence in these three studies 
suggests a modest ability to "beat the market."  
  
This discussion points to a need for further research on the performance of market 
advisory services.  Previous studies only examine advisory service performance in marketing 
corn and soybeans.  It is not known whether the results generalize to other commodities with 
different production and consumption characteristics.  Wheat represents an interesting additional 
market to examine advisory service performance. It differs significantly from corn and soybeans 
with respect to the timing and location of production, yield growth trends, seasonality and  2 
consumption uses.  Hence, we would expect different marketing patterns, and potentially, 
different results than have been reported for corn and soybeans. 
 
The purpose of this report is to investigate the performance of agricultural market 
advisory services in marketing wheat.  Following Irwin, Good, Martines-Filho and Jackson 
(2000) two key performance questions will be addressed: 1) Do market advisory services, on 
average, outperform an appropriate wheat market benchmark? and 2) Do market advisory 
services exhibit persistence in their wheat performance from year-to-year?  The data for the 
study is provided by the Agricultural Market Advisory Service (AgMAS) Project, which has 
been collecting wheat track records for at least 20 advisory services since September 1994.  At 
the present time, track records are available for the 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 crop years. Since 
the AgMAS Project subscribes to all of the services and collects "real-time" recommendations, 
the data are not subject to survivorship bias.  While the sample of advisory services is non-
random, it is constructed to be generally representative of the majority of advisory services 
offered to farmers.  The availability of only four crop years is a limitation of the analysis, but the 
time period considered does include years of rapidly increasing and decreasing wheat prices. 
 
  The procedure used to compute net wheat prices for each advisory service is outlined in 
the earlier AgMAS report by Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000).  In 
particular, after the stream of recommendations is collected for a given commodity in a particular 
crop year, the net price that would have been received by a wheat farmer that precisely follows 
the set of marketing recommendations is computed.  This net price is the weighted average of the 
cash sale price plus or minus gains/losses associated with futures and options transactions.  
Brokerage costs are accounted for, as are storage costs and marketing loan payments.  
   
The tests used to determine average performance of market advisory services and 
predictability of performance through time have been widely applied in the financial literature 
(e.g., Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler, 1987; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Irwin, Zulauf, 
and Ward, 1994; Jaffe and Mahoney, 1999; Metrick, 1999; Carpenter and Lynch, 1999).  Two 
tests of performance relative to a benchmark are used: i) the proportion of services exceeding the 
benchmark price and ii) the average percentage difference between the net price of services and 
the benchmark price.  Three tests of predictability are used: i) the correlation of advisory service 
pricing performance measures from year-to-year, ii) the predictability of “winner” and “loser” 
categories from year-to-year and iii) the differences between pricing performance measures for 
“top” and “bottom” performing advisory services.  
 
Data on Advisory Service Recommendations 
 
The market advisory services included in this evaluation do not comprise the population 
of market advisory services available to farmers.  The included services also are not a random 
sample of the population of market advisory services.  Neither approach is feasible because no 
public agency or trade group assembles a list of advisory services that could be considered the 
"population."  Furthermore, there is not a generally agreed upon definition of an agricultural 
market advisory service.  To assemble a sample of services for the AgMAS Project, criteria were 
developed to define an agricultural market advisory service and a list of services assembled. 
  3 
The first criterion used to identify services is that a service has to provide marketing 
advice to farmers. Some of the services tracked by the AgMAS Project do provide speculative 
trading advice, but that advice must be clearly differentiated from marketing advice to farmers 
for the service to be included.  The terms "speculative" trading of futures and options versus the 
use of futures and options for "hedging" purposes are used for identification purposes only.  A 
discussion of what types of futures and options trading activities constitute hedging, as opposed 
to speculating, is not considered. 
 
The second criterion is that specific advice must be given for making cash sales of the 
commodity, in addition to any futures or options hedging activities.  In fact, some marketing 
programs evaluated by the AgMAS Project do not make any futures and options 
recommendations.  However, marketing programs that make futures and options hedging 
recommendations, but fail to clearly state when cash sales should be made, or the amount to be 
sold, are not considered. 
 
  The original sample of market advisory services that met the two criteria were drawn 
from the list of  "Premium Services" available from the two major agricultural satellite networks, 
Data Transmission Network (DTN) and FarmDayta in the summer of 1994.
3, 4  While the list of 
advisory services available from these networks was by no means exhaustive, it did have the 
considerable merit of meeting a market test.  Presumably, the services offered by the networks 
were those most in demand by farm subscribers to the networks.  In addition, the list of available 
services was cross-checked with other farm publications to confirm that widely-followed 
advisory firms were included in the sample.  It seems reasonable to argue that the resulting 
sample of services was (and remains) generally representative of the majority of advisory 
services available to farmers. 
 
  The sample for 1995 includes 24 market advisory services for wheat.  For a variety of 
reasons, deletions and additions to the 1995 sample occur over time.
5  In 1996, the total number 
of advisory services is 23, while in 1997 the total is 20.  In 1998, the total number of advisory 
services is 21. A directory of the advisory services included in the study can be found at the 
AgMAS Project website (http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/farm.doc/agmas/). 
 
  As mentioned earlier, sample selection biases may plague advisory service databases.  
The first form is survival bias, which occurs if only advisory services that remain in business at 
the end of a given period are included in the sample.  Survival bias significantly biases measures 
of performance upwards since "survivors" typically have higher performance than "non-
survivors" (Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross, 1992).  This form of bias should not be 
present in the AgMAS database of advisory services because all services ever tracked are 
included in the sample.  The second and more subtle form of bias is hindsight bias, which occurs 
if data from prior periods are "back-filled" at the point in time when an advisory service is added 
to the database.  Statistically, this has the same effect as survivorship bias because data from 
surviving advisory services are back-filled.  This form of bias should not be present in the 
AgMAS database because recommendations are not back-filled when an advisory service is 
added.  Instead, recommendations are collected only for the crop year after a decision has been 
made to add an advisory service to the database. 
  4 
The actual daily process of collecting recommendations for the sample of advisory 
services begins with the purchase of subscriptions to each of the services.  Staff members of the 
AgMAS Project read the information provided by each advisory service on a daily basis.  The 
information is received electronically, via DTN, websites or e-mail.  For the services that provide 
two daily updates, typically in the morning and at noon, information is read in the morning and 
afternoon.  In this way, the actions of a farmer-subscriber are simulated in “real-time.” 
 
The recommendations of each advisory service are recorded separately.  Some advisory 
services offer two or more distinct marketing programs.  This typically takes the form of one set 
of advice for marketers who are willing to use futures and options (although futures and options 
are not always used), and a separate set of advice for farmers who only wish to make cash sales.
6  
In this situation, both strategies are recorded and treated as distinct strategies to be evaluated.
7  
 
Several procedures are used to check the recorded recommendations for accuracy and 
completeness.  Whenever possible, recorded recommendations are cross-checked against later 
status reports provided by the relevant advisory service.  Also, at the completion of the crop year, 
it is confirmed whether cash sales total exactly 100%, all futures positions are offset, and all 
options positions are offset or expire. 
 
The final set of recommendations attributed to each advisory service represents the best 
efforts of the AgMAS Project staff to accurately and fairly interpret the information made 
available by each advisory service.  In cases where a recommendation is considered vague or 
unclear, some judgment is exercised as to whether or not to include that particular 
recommendation or how to implement the recommendation.  Given that some recommendations 
are subject to interpretation, the possibility is acknowledged that the AgMAS track record of 
recommendations for a given service may differ from that stated by the advisory service, or from 
that recorded by another subscriber. 
 
Calculation of Net Advisory Service Prices 
 
At the end of a crop year, all of the (filled) recommendations are aligned in chronological 
order.  The advice for a given crop year is considered to be complete for each advisory service 
when cumulative cash sales of the commodity reach 100%, all open futures positions covering 
the crop are offset, all open option positions covering the crop are either offset or expired, and 
the advisory service discontinues giving advice for that crop year.  The returns to each 
recommendation are then calculated in order to arrive at a weighted-average net price that would 
be received by a farmer who precisely follows the marketing advice (as recorded by the AgMAS 
Project). 
 
In order to simulate a consistent and comparable set of results across the different 
advisory services, certain explicit assumptions are made.  These assumptions are intended to 
accurately depict marketing conditions for a representative, southwest Illinois farm.  An 
overview of the simulation assumptions is presented below.  Complete details of the simulation 
assumptions can be found in Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000).  5 
 
Wheat Class and Geographic Location 
 
  An issue of first importance is the appropriate class of wheat and location of production 
to use in the simulation.  In the US, six classes of wheat are grown and there are five wheat 
futures contracts traded on three different exchanges.  The simulation is designed to reflect 
conditions facing a representative soft red winter wheat farmer in southwest Illinois.  Whenever 
possible, data are collected for the West Southwest Crop Reporting District in Illinois as defined 
by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of the US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA).  Thirteen counties (Cass, Pike, Scott, Morgan, Sangamon, Christian, Calhoun, Greene, 
Macoupin, Montgomery, Jersey, Madison, and Bond) make up this District.  For ease of reading, 
this area will be referred to in the remainder of this report as southwest Illinois, unless it is 
necessary to reference the actual crop or price reporting district. 
 
There are two principal reasons that soft red winter wheat in southwest Illinois is used as 
the basis for the simulation.  The first reason is that soft red winter wheat recommendations are 
the most common class of wheat recommendations made by advisory programs.  The programs 
included in this study either specifically make recommendations for this class of wheat or the 
recommendations most closely align with this class of wheat.  There are three programs included 
in the former category; that is, they specifically identify recommendations by class of wheat.  
The remaining programs do not specifically identify the class of wheat, but several pieces of 
evidence point in the direction of soft red winter wheat as the target class: i) most futures 
hedging advice refers to the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) wheat contract, ii) the programs 
generally make harvest recommendations for June and early July, the harvest period for winter 
wheat and iii) the programs that give basis advice generally recommend basis levels in soft red 
winter wheat production areas.  
 
  The second reason that soft red winter wheat in southwest Illinois is used in the 
simulation is data availability.  An exhaustive search was conducted for a public series of daily 
cash and forward contract prices for interior elevators in major hard red winter, hard red spring, 
and soft red winter wheat production areas of the US.  Several public sources of cash spot prices 
were located for each of the different classes.  However, the only public source of forward 
contract prices is Illinois Ag Market News, and this agency only reports bids for soft red winter 
wheat.  This is an important limiting factor, as many advisory programs make substantial use of 
pre-harvest forward contracts.  It may be possible to obtain forward contract prices from private 
sources in other regions, but this is costly and may result in forward price data of uncertain 
accuracy. 
 
An important question is the degree to which performance results based on soft red 
winter wheat production in southwest Illinois can be generalized to other classes and locations of 
wheat production in the US.  To provide some perspective on this issue, yields and prices for two 
other areas of wheat production in the US are compared to southwest Illinois.  Figure 1 presents 
the relationship between deviations from trend for the West Southwest Illinois Crop Reporting 
District (soft red winter), Southwest Kansas Crop Reporting District (hard red winter), and 
Northeast South Dakota Crop Reporting District (hard red spring) over 1972-1998.  The 
correlation of the deviations from trend shows a weak positive relationship between the yield  6 
deviations for southwest Illinois and the other two regions.  There is only a slight tendency for 
southwest Illinois wheat yields to be above trend at the same time that Kansas or South Dakota 
yields are above trend, and vice versa. 
 
  The history of daily cash prices for wheat in Illinois, Kansas and South Dakota is 
presented in Figures 2 for the period June 1995 through May 1999.  Soft red winter wheat prices 
are presented for the West Southwest Illinois Price Reporting District, hard red winter wheat 
prices are shown for the Western Kansas Price Reporting District and hard red spring wheat 
prices are shown for the East River South Dakota Price Reporting District.  These price districts 
most closely match the crop districts used above to compare yields.  Price changes are analyzed 
because the time series properties of commodity prices strongly suggest that unbiased estimates 
of price correlations should be based on price changes rather than price levels (e.g., Brown, 
1985).  The correlations are highly positive between Illinois and the other two areas.  Not 
surprisingly, a high correlation is observed between Illinois and Kansas, as these two areas 
produce winter wheat.  It is interesting to note that the correlation estimate of 0.83 is quite close 
to similar estimates reported in studies of optimal wheat cross-hedging (e.g., Brorsen, Buck and 
Koontz, 1998). The correlation is also high between Illinois and South Dakota, even though 
Illinois produces winter wheat and South Dakota produces spring wheat. Finally, while these 
correlations are based on cash prices, it is expected that similar correlations exist across futures 
prices for the different wheat classes, due to inter-market spread trading and arbitrage. 
 
The previous results present a mixed picture regarding the degree to which performance 
results based on soft red winter wheat production in southwest Illinois can be generalized to 
other classes and locations of wheat production in the US.  On one hand, there appears to be little 
relationship in wheat yields across classes and locations.  On the other hand, there is a highly 
positive relationship between wheat prices across classes and locations. It is an empirical 
question whether the lack of a relationship between yields or the positive relationship between 
prices has the dominant impact on performance evaluations.  One plausible outcome is that the 
low correlation in yields is more than offset by the high correlation in prices, and hence, it is 
reasonable to generalize performance evaluations for soft red winter wheat production in 
southwest Illinois to other wheat classes and locations.  An equally plausible outcome is that the 
low correlation in yields more than offsets the high correlation in prices, and hence, it is 
unreasonable to generalize performance evaluations for soft red winter wheat production in 
southwest Illinois to other wheat classes and locations.  Until empirical evidence is available on 
this question, caution is suggested before attempting to generalize the performance results to 




  In general, a two-year marketing window, spanning June 1
st of the year prior to harvest 
through May 31
st of the year following harvest, is used in the analysis.  The beginning date is 
selected because it reflects a “realistic” time when new crop sales begin.  The ending date is 
selected to be consistent with the ending date for wheat marketing years as defined by the 
USDA.  There are some exceptions to the marketing window definition.  The most frequent 
exceptions are when programs have relatively small amounts (20 percent or less) of cash wheat  
unsold at the end of a window.  In such cases, the actual sales recommendations on the indicated  7 
dates are recorded. Finally, note that throughout the remainder of this report, the term "crop 
year" is used to represent the two-year marketing window. 
 
There are three exceptions to the marketing window that should be highlighted.  One 
service held 1997 wheat far beyond the end of the 1997 marketing window and two services did 
the same for 1998 wheat.  More specifically, as of May 31, 2000, the Allendale (futures only) 
service had not recommended any cash sales for either the 1997 or 1998 wheat crops.  However, 
both crops were fully hedged using wheat futures.  As of May 31, 2000, Ag Profit by Hjort 
Associates had not sold any of the 1998 wheat crop.  In order to complete the analysis for these 
two services, the futures positions and all remaining cash quantities are marked-to-the-market as 




The cash price assigned to each cash sale recommendation is the West Southwest Illinois 
Price Reporting District closing, or overnight, bid.  Similarly, the forward contract price assigned 
to all pre-harvest forward sales is the forward bid for the West Southwest Price Reporting 
District.  The cash and forward contract data are collected and reported by the Illinois 
Department of Ag Market News.    Cash and forward contract prices in this area best reflect 
prices for the assumed geographic location of the representative southwest Illinois farmer (West 
Southwest Illinois Crop Reporting District). Futures prices and options premia are Chicago 




Since most of the advisory program recommendations are given in terms of the 
proportion of total production (e.g., “sell ten percent of 1998 crop today”), some assumption 
must be made about the amount of production to be marketed.  For the purposes of this study, if 
the per-acre yield is assumed to be 50 bushels, then a recommendation to sell ten percent of the 
wheat crop translates into selling five bushels.  When all of the advice for the marketing period 
has been carried out, the final per-bushel selling price is the average price for each transaction 
weighted by the amount marketed in each transaction. 
 
When making hedging or forward contracting decisions prior to harvest, the actual yield 
is unknown.  Hence, an assumption regarding the amount of expected production per acre is 
necessary to accurately reflect the returns to marketing advice.  When yield is near or above 
trend, there is normally not a problem in meeting forward pricing obligations.  Hence, in a 
“normal” crop year, expected yield is assumed to equal trend yield for the entire pre-harvest 
period.  The adjustment from expected to actual yield in this case is assumed to occur on the first 
day of wheat harvest.  The expected yield for the West Southwest Illinois Crop Reporting 
District is computed from a linear regression trend model of actual yields from 1972 through the 
year previous to harvest.  For example, the trend yield forecast for 1998 is based on a regression 
using 1972 to 1997 yield data.   
 
  When actual yield is substantially below trend, and forward pricing obligations are based 
on trend yields, a farmer may have difficulty meeting such obligations.  This raises the issue of  8 
updating yield expectations in “short” crop years to minimize the chance of defaulting on 
forward pricing obligations. A relatively simple procedure is used to update yield expectations in 
short crop years.  First, trend yield is used as the expected yield until the May USDA Crop 
Production Report is released, typically around May 10
th.  Second, if the USDA wheat yield 
estimate for southwest Illinois is 20 percent (or more) lower than trend yield, a “reasonable” 
farmer is assumed to change yield expectations to the lower USDA estimate.  Third, as with 




Brokerage costs are incurred when farmers open or close positions in futures and options 
markets.  For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that brokerage costs are $50 per contract 
for round-turn futures transactions, and $30 per contract to enter or exit an options position.  
Further, it is assumed that CBOT wheat futures or options contracts are used, and the contract 
size for each commodity is 5,000 bushels.  Therefore, per-bushel brokerage costs are one cent 





An important element in assessing returns to an advisory program is the economic cost 
associated with storing grain instead of selling grain immediately at harvest.  The cost of storing 
grain after harvest (carrying costs) consists of two components: physical storage charges and the 
opportunity cost incurred by foregoing sales when the crop is harvested.  Physical storage 
charges can apply to off-farm (commercial) storage, on-farm storage, or some combination of the 
two.  Opportunity cost is the same regardless of the type of physical storage. 
 
For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that all storage occurs off-farm at 
commercial sites.  Storage charges are assigned beginning with the first day after the end of a 
harvest window.  Physical storage charges have a fixed component (in-charge) of four cents per 
bushel that is assigned the day storage begins.  The variable component is 2.5 cents per bushel 
per month, with this charge pro-rated to the day when the cash sale is made.  The storage costs 
represent the typical storage charges for the 1995-1998 wheat crops quoted in a telephone survey 
of southwest Illinois elevators. 
 
The interest charge for storing grain is the interest rate compounded daily from the end of 
wheat harvest to the date of sale.  The interest rate used is the average rate for all commercial 
agricultural loans for the third quarter of the harvest year as reported in the Agricultural Finance 
Databook published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board.  This interest rate 
has been around nine percent per year for the four years of this study. 
 
LDP and Marketing Assistance Loan Payments 
 
The price of wheat is below the loan rate during significant periods of time in the 1998-
1999 marketing year, so that use of the marketing loan program is an important part of marketing 
strategies during this period.  Most of the advisory programs tracked by the AgMAS Project for  9 
the 1998 crop make specific recommendations regarding the timing and method of implementing 
the loan program for the entire wheat crop.  These recommendations are implemented as given 
wherever feasible.  Several decision rules have to be developed even in this case, in particular, 
for pre-harvest forward contracts.  For a few programs, loan recommendations are incomplete or 
not made at all.  For these cases, it is necessary to develop a more complete set of decision rules 
for implementing the loan program in the marketing of wheat.  All loan-related decision rules are 
based on the assumption of a “prudent” or “rational” farmer, within the context of the intent of 
the loan program.  More specifically, it is assumed that a farmer will take advantage of the price 
protection offered by the loan program, even in the absence of specific advice from an advisory 
program. Further information on the decision rules used to implement marketing loan 




Simply comparing the net price received across advisory services will not answer the 
question of whether advisory services as a group enhance the income of farm subscribers.  
Instead, a comparison to a benchmark price (or prices) is needed to evaluate the performance of 
advisory services relative to pricing opportunities offered by the market.  In the stock market, 
mutual funds are evaluated with respect to market benchmark performance criteria (e.g., Bodie, 
Kane, and Marcus, 1989).  These benchmarks typically are indexes of stock market returns over 
the period of evaluation, e.g., the Dow Jones Industrial Average and Standard and Poor’s 500. 
 
The selection of a benchmark for advisory service performance evaluations is examined 
in a study by Good, Irwin and Jackson (1998).  They argue that the most appropriate market 
benchmark is the average price over the entire, relevant marketing horizon.  Applied to wheat, 
the marketing window for a given crop spans two calendar years, beginning on the first business 
day of June in the year prior to harvest, and extends through the last business day of May in the 
year after harvest.  Hence, the market benchmark is calculated as the average of the daily 
southwest Illinois cash wheat bids available for the two-year marketing window.  Pre-harvest 
cash prices represent cash-forward bids for harvest delivery in southwest Illinois, while daily 
spot prices for southwest Illinois are used for the post-harvest period. 
 
Three adjustments are made to the daily cash prices to make the average cash price 
benchmark consistent with the calculated net advisory prices for each marketing program.  The 
first is to take a weighted average price, to account for changing yield expectations, instead of 
taking the simple average of the daily prices.  The daily weighting factors for pre-harvest prices 
in normal years are based on the calculated trend yield, while the weighting of the post-harvest 
prices is based on the actual reported yield for southwest Illinois.  In short-crop years, yield 
expectations are updated with the release of the USDA May Crop Production Report, using the 
same procedure applied to advisory program recommendations.  The second adjustment is to 
compute post-harvest cash prices on a harvest equivalent basis, which is done by subtracting 
carrying charges (storage and interest) from post-harvest spot cash prices.  The daily carrying 
charges are calculated in the same manner as those for net advisory prices. 
 
A third adjustment to the average cash price benchmark is made only for 1998.  This 
adjustment is based on the logic that a  “prudent” or “rational” farmer will take advantage of the  10 
price protection offered by the marketing loan program when following the benchmark average 
price strategy.  Based on this argument, the average cash price benchmark is adjusted by the 
addition of marketing loan benefits.  Bushels marketed in the pre-harvest period according to the 
benchmark strategy (approximately 53 percent) are treated as forward contracts with the benefits 
assigned at harvest.  Bushels marketed each day in the post-harvest period (approximately 47 
percent) are awarded marketing loan benefits in existence for that particular day.   
 
In order to test the sensitivity of performance results to the choice of market benchmark,  
two alternative versions of the previous average cash price benchmark also are considered in the 
analysis.  The first alternative benchmark averages prices for the 20-month period starting in 
October of the year previous to harvest and ending in May of the year after harvest. The only 
difference between this alternative and the 24-month benchmark is the exclusion of the pre-
harvest period previous to October.  Hence, this alternative benchmark places more weight on 
post-harvest prices than pre-harvest prices.  The second alternative benchmark averages prices 
only for a 16-month crop year, which excludes prices previous to February. 
 
Net Price Received Results for 1995 - 1998 
 
Net price received for the sample of market advisory services for the 1995, 1996, 1997 
and 1998 crop years is reported in Tables 1.
8  Note that some of the market advisory services 
included in the table are not evaluated for all four years.  The four-year averages and standard 
deviations are calculated only for the 18 services that are evaluated for all four years. 
 
As shown in Table 1, the annual average net advisory price for wheat ranges from $2.36 
per bushel in 1998 to $3.81 per bushel in 1996.  The four-year average for the 18 services is 
$3.15 per bushel.  The range of four-year average net advisory prices is large, with a low of 
$2.76 per bushel and a high of $3.48 per bushel.  Not surprisingly, the range within the 
individual years is even more substantial.  The most dramatic example is 1997, where the 
minimum is $1.34 per bushel and the maximum is $3.90 per bushel.  Even in years with less 
market price volatility, such as 1998, the range in performance typically is around two dollars 
per bushel.   
 
  The three alternative market benchmark prices for wheat are shown at the bottom of 
Table 1.  Four-year averages of the market benchmarks differ by one cent per bushel or less.  
However, this masks large differences within some of the years, particularly 1998.  These data 
suggest advisory service performance results for wheat may be sensitive to the selected 
benchmark.    
 
Wheat revenue results for the advisory services are presented in Table 2.  For a given 
year, revenue is computed as the net advisory price times the actual yield.
9 Revenue results are 
reported to provide perspective on the economic magnitude of differences in pricing 
performance.  In addition, annual yield variation may cause average revenue and average price 
results to differ across services.  In particular, the impact of the relatively good and poor pricing 
performance may be reduced or exaggerated depending on whether it is associated with large or 
small wheat crops.  The four-year average advisory revenue for all 18 services is $151 per acre,  11 
and ranges from a low of $134 per acre to a high of $173 per acre.  The range of revenue for 
individual years can be quite large, twice exceeding $100 per acre (1997 and 1998). 
 
Statistical Tests of Market Advisory Service Pricing Performance 
 
Two statistical tests are used to test the null hypothesis that average market advisory 
service pricing performance does not differ from that of the market benchmark.  The first test is 
based on the proportion of services exceeding the benchmark price.  This test is considered 
because it is not influenced by extremely high or low advisory prices.  The second test is based 
on the average percentage difference between the net price of services and the benchmark price.  
This test is useful because it takes into account the average magnitude of differences from the 
benchmark. 
 
Independence of Observations 
 
  Before considering the statistical tests and results, an important issue needs to be 
explored that may have a substantial impact on the results.  The issue is whether the sample 
observations on net advisory price are independent, both within and across years.  The most 
likely form of dependence is positive correlation, which, if ignored, would cause sample standard 
deviation estimates across advisory services to be understated.  This in turn would cause the 
statistical significance of hypothesis test results to be overstated.   
 
There are two potential ways that independence could be violated in the sample of market 
advisory service prices.  The first potential source of dependence is correlation of net advisory 
prices through time for a given service.  This form of correlation may exist due to persistence in 
the performance of advisory services through time (winners continue to win, losers continue to 
lose).  It may also exist due to the overlapping nature of the crop years; each crop year is two 
calendar years long, and each set of contiguous crop years overlaps by one year.  If this 
correlation through time exists, it would be inappropriate to pool samples of net advisory prices 
across crop years for the same reason as discussed above.  As will be shown in a following 
section, this form of correlation generally is minimal, and therefore, it is reasonable to pool net 
advisory prices across crop years.   
 
A second potential source of dependence perhaps is less obvious.  It is possible that net 
advisory prices for a given commodity and crop year are correlated because of the existence of 
similar programs offered by the same market advisory service.  For example, Agri-Visor offers 
four marketing programs, which may not differ substantially in outcomes due to similar methods 
of analysis and similar underlying strategies.  The potential impact of this form of correlation is 
examined by creating one net advisory price for each of the market advisory firms that offer 
multiple programs.
10  A single price is computed by averaging net advisory prices across 
programs for a given year and commodity.  Pricing performance results are qualitatively similar 
to those using the full set of disaggregated advisory prices, suggesting that net prices of advisory 
programs for the same firm are uncorrelated or no more correlated than net prices from different 
firms.  Hence, use of net advisory prices by program in tests of market performance does not 
appear to be a substantive problem. 





A formal test of the null hypothesis that the proportion of advisory services "beating" the 
market benchmark is insignificant requires the specification of an appropriate test statistic. First, 









where k is the number of advisory services that have net prices exceeding the market benchmark 
price and n is the total number of advisory services in the sample. Anderson, Sweeney and 
Williams  (1996) show that the sample estimator of the proportion,  p , is distributed binomially 
with an expected value of  p and a standard error of pp n () / 1− , where p is the true value of 
the proportion in the population. They also note that the sampling distribution of  p  is 
approximately normal so long as np ≥ 5 and np () 15 −≥ .  Since both conditions are met for all 
of the samples considered here, the normality approximation is invoked.  The form of the test 
statistic based on the above assumptions is, 
 
(2)  Zp p p pn =− − () ( ) / 000 1   
 
where p0 is the assumed value of p under the null hypothesis.  The remaining issue is the 
expected proportion (p0) under the null hypothesis.  The efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 
1970) implies that the expected probability of “beating the market” is the same as the result of 
flipping a coin and showing heads, or 0.5.  Setting  p0 05 = . , the test statistic is, 
 
(3)  Zp n =− (. ) . / 05 025 .   
 
   A formal test of the null hypothesis that the average percentage difference between the 
net price of services and the benchmark price is zero also requires the specification of an 
appropriate test statistic.  First, define the percentage difference for the i
th advisory service for a 
given crop year as, 
 
(4)  ln( / ) 100 ii r NAP BP =⋅    
 
where NAPi is the net advisory price for the i
th advisory service and BP is the market benchmark 








= ∑  is well-known and does not 
need to be described in detail here.  The test statistic for a null hypothesis of zero average 
percentage difference is, 
 
(5)  tr n = ! σdi     13 
 
where  ! σ  is the estimated standard deviation of the percentage differences across the n advisory 
services in the sample.  The t-statistic follows a t-distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom.   
 
It is possible to think of ri as the “return” to following the recommendations of a 
particular market advisory service.  This raises the question of whether the calculated “returns” 
are risk-adjusted.  One method of adjusting returns for risk that has been used in a number of 
studies stock investment strategies (e.g., Friend, Blume and Crocket, 1970; Ritter, 1991) is to 
match the average risk of the investments to the risk of the benchmark.  Hence, if the average 
risk of advisory services is equal to risk of the market benchmark, then market advisory returns 
can be considered risk-adjusted returns.  Evidence on the appropriateness of this “risk-matching” 
assumption for advisory services can be found in Tables 1 and 2, where the standard deviations 
for the advisory services and market benchmarks can be found in the last column of each table.  
As shown in Table 1, the average standard deviation for net advisory prices in wheat is $0.86 per 
bushel, substantially greater than the standard deviations for the three benchmarks.  Turning to 
Table 2, the average standard deviation for advisory service revenue is $33 per acre, again larger 
than the standard deviations for the three benchmarks, but closer than in the case of net prices. 
Overall, the comparisons suggest the risk of the market benchmarks does not match the average 
risk of the advisory services, and hence, it is likely inappropriate to consider computed “returns” 
as being risk-adjusted.  
 
It is important to emphasize that the tests discussed in this section address the pricing 
performance of market advisory services as a group.  In other words, average pricing 
performance across all services is considered.  This is a different issue than the pricing 
performance of a particular advisory service.  It is possible that advisory services as a group fail 
to beat the market, yet at the same time there exist a small number of services that are exceptions 
to this outcome. In the stock market, this argument is often made with respect to the performance 
of the Fidelity Magellan Fund.  Testing whether an “exceptional” advisory service beats the 
market requires more data than is available for this study and different statistical methods 
(Marcus, 1990).   
 
Performance Test Results 
 
Table 3 reports results of the proportional test of wheat pricing performance for each year 
and all four years pooled.
11  Statistical significance is based on a null hypothesis proportion of 
0.5, the same as the proportion of heads observed in the flips of a fair coin.  Individual year 
results are somewhat sensitive to the benchmark considered.  For example, the proportion of 
programs above the 24-month benchmark price in 1998 is 0.05 and statistically smaller than 0.5, 
while the proportion of programs above the 16-month benchmark is 0.29 and insignificantly 
different from 0.5.  However, the proportion pooled across the four years does not vary 
substantially across the benchmarks, ranging from 0.32 to 0.34.  Pooled four-year proportions 
based on all three benchmarks are significantly different from 0.5 at the one-percent level. 
Individual year results generally show proportions significantly less than 0.5 in three of the four 
years:  1996, 1997 and 1998.  The smallest proportions are found in 1997 and 1998. Finally, 
there is only one case where a proportion is significantly greater than 0.5 (1995, 24-month 
benchmark).  14 
 
  Results for the average return test of pricing performance are reported in Table 4.  Pooled 
four-year and individual year test results are qualitatively similar to the proportional test results. 
Point estimates of the four-year average return range from –9.75 to –10.48 percent.  All of the 
four-year average returns are significantly different from zero at the one-percent level.  In some 
individual years the magnitude of underperformance is surprisingly large.  For example, average 
return estimates for 1997 range from –18.89 to –23.01 percent.  
 
  In statistical terms, the pricing performance test results presented in this section are clear.  
Not only do market advisory programs in wheat consistently fail to “beat the market,” their 
performance is significantly worse than the market.  The level of under-performance is striking 
and consistent.  Point estimates of proportions for individual years are less than 0.5 in ten of 
twelve test cases.  Likewise, point estimates of average return for individual years are negative in 
ten of twelve test cases.  Finally, the average return of the services over the four crop years is 
about –10 percent, regardless of which of the three benchmarks is considered. 
  
Given the statistical results summarized above, a relevant question to ask is whether the 
pricing under-performance of advisory programs also is economically significant.  While 
"economic significance" is a vague concept, it is important nonetheless.  A useful perspective on 
this question is gained by examining wheat revenue per acre (see Appendix Table A2).  The best 
point estimate of advisory revenue return probably is the simple average across the three 
benchmarks.  This “grand average” revenue return across all four crop years and three 
benchmarks is –10.20 percent, which translates into advisory revenue averaging $14 per acre 
below benchmark revenue.
12  By any reasonable standard, this is an economically non-trivial 
level of under-performance.
13   
 
The pricing performance results for wheat stand in sharp contrast to those reported for 
corn and soybeans.   Irwin, Good, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) analyze the pricing 
performance of corn and soybean market advisory programs tracked by the AgMAS Project over 
1995-1998.  They find that market advisory services in corn and soybeans have a “small” ability 
to “beat the market,” with combined corn and soybean revenue for the advisory programs 
averaging about $4 per acre more than benchmark revenue.  Two explanations seem plausible for 
the divergence in results across corn and soybeans and wheat.  First, the divergence may simply 
be an artifact of a relatively small sample of years, where wheat advisory performance is by 
chance unusually poor and/or corn and soybean advisory performance is unusually good.  
Second, advisory programs may be more skillfull in analyzing and forecasting corn and soybean 
prices than wheat prices. 
 
The results of the analysis also have implications for the ongoing debate about market 
efficiency and risk management strategies in agriculture.  One view is that grain markets (cash, 
futures and options) are not efficient and, therefore, provide opportunities for farmers to 
systematically earn additional profits through marketing (e.g., Wisner, Blue and Baldwin, 1998).  
The other view is that grain markets are at least efficient with respect to the type of strategies 
available to farmers (e.g., Zulauf and Irwin, 1998).  Since the returns of wheat advisory programs 
over 1995-1998 are significantly less than transactions cost, including the cost of the programs, 
the results are consistent with market efficiency in the sense of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).  15 
Furthermore, the performance results suggest market advisory services have less access to 
information than that available to other wheat market participants and/or inferior analytical 
skills. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to compare the pricing performance results for market advisory 
services to that of other investment professionals.  Malkiel (1999) reports that only 33 percent of 
active mutual fund managers beat the returns to the S&P 500 stock index over 1974-1998.  
Clements (1999) notes that only nine percent of active managers beat the S&P 500 in the decade 
ending in 1998. The performance of agricultural market advisory services in wheat is roughly 
comparable. 
  
Predictability of Advisory Service Performance 
 
Even if advisory programs as a group generate negative returns, there is a wide range in 
performance for any given year.  For example, wheat net advisory prices for 1997 vary from 
$1.34 per bushel to $3.90 per bushel (Table 1).  While this example is the most dramatic, the 
variation across advisors in other years also is substantial.  This raises the important question of 
the predictability of advisory service performance from year-to-year.  In other words, is past 
performance indicative of future results?  Three tests of predictability are used: i) the correlation 
of advisory service prices, ranks and percentage differences from the benchmark across 
overlapping and non-overlapping pairs of adjacent crop years, ii) predictability of “winner” and 
“loser” categories across overlapping and non-overlapping pairs of adjacent crop years and iii) 
differences between prices, ranks and percentage differences from the benchmark for “top” and 
“bottom” performing advisory services across overlapping and non-overlapping pairs of adjacent 
crop years. The testing procedures have been widely applied in studies of financial investment 
performance (e.g., Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler, 1987; Irwin, Zulauf and Ward, 1994; 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Malkiel, 1995).   
 
The distinction between overlapping and non-overlapping crop years is due to the fact 
that each marketing window is two calendar years in length, and hence, two adjacent marketing 
windows overlap by one calendar year.  This overlap may influence predictability results, in that 
persistence between overlapping years may be due to “true” persistence in performance or the 
overlapping nature of the periods of comparison.  Persistence for non-overlapping years 




The first test of predictability is based on the correlation between performance measures 
of individual market advisory services across overlapping and non-overlapping pairs of crop 
years.  Brorsen and Townsend (1998) show that this type of test is reasonably powerful in 
detecting performance persistence in managed futures funds if it exists. For a given commodity, 
the first step in this testing procedure is to form the sample of all advisory services that are active 
in both adjacent years (overlapping or non-overlapping).  The second step is to rank each 
advisory service in the first year of the pair (e.g., t = 1997) based on net price received. Then the 
services are sorted in descending order.  For example, the service with the highest net advisory 
price is ranked number one, and the service with the lowest net advisory price is assigned a rank  16 
equal to the total number of services for that commodity in the given year.  The third step is to 
sort and rank the sample of services in the second year of the pair (e.g., t + 1  = 1998). The 
fourth step is to estimate the correlation coefficient between performance measures for the two 
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where  , it NAP  is the sample average of net advisory prices for year t,  , it RK  is the sample average 
of net advisory ranks for year t and  , it r  is the sample average of net advisory percentage 
differences from the market benchmark for year t. Finally, using Bartlett’s approximation for the 
standard error (1 n ) of the correlation coefficient, the following test statistic is used to test the 











where j = NAPt,t+1, RKt,t+1 and rt,t+1. The sampling distribution of the test statistic Zj 
approximately follows a standard, normal distribution. 
 
The second test of predictability is based on placing advisory services into “winner” and 
“loser” categories across overlapping and non-overlapping pairs of adjacent crop years. The 
resulting 2 x 2 contingency table of winner and loser counts allows the use of non-parametric 
statistical testing procedures.  Carpenter and Lynch (1999) indicate this test is well-specified and 
powerful in detecting persistence in mutual fund returns. The first step in this testing procedure is 
to form the sample of all advisory services that are active in both adjacent years (overlapping or 
non-overlapping).  The second step is to rank each advisory service in the first year of the pair 
(e.g., t = 1997) based on net price received. Then the services are sorted in descending order. The 
third step is to form two groups of services in the first year of the pair: winners are those services 
in the top half of the rankings and losers are services in the bottom half. The third step is to rank  17 
each advisory service in the second year of the pair (e.g., t +1 = 1998) based on net price 
received and once again form winner and loser groups of services. The fourth step is to compute 
the following counts for the advisory services in the pair of years: WW = winner t-winner t+1, 
WL = winner t-loser t+1, LW = loser t-winner t+1, LL = loser t-loser t+1. The fifth step is to 
compute the following odds ratio,  
 











which estimates the ratio of the odds of a winning service in t being a winning service in t+1 to 
the odds of a losing service in t being a winning service in t+1. The null hypothesis of no 
predictability is true when the odds ratio equals one.  Christenson (1997) notes that it is more 
convenient mathematically to test the equivalent null hypothesis that the natural logarithm of the 



































The sampling distribution of the test statistic Zt,t+1 asymptotically follows a standard, normal 
distribution 
 
The third test of predictability is based on the differences between prices, ranks and 
percentage differences from the benchmark for “top” and “bottom” performing advisory services 
across overlapping and non-overlapping pairs of adjacent crop years. This test is based on the 
observation that predictability in advisory service performance may not exist across all advisory 
services, but it is possible that sub-groups of advisory services may exhibit predictability.  In 
particular, predictability may only be found at the extremes of performance.  That is, only top-
performing services in one year may tend to perform well in the next year, or only poor-
performing services may perform poorly in the next year. Carpenter and Lynch (1999) indicate 
this type of test also is well-specified and powerful in detecting persistence in mutual fund 
returns.  
 
The first step in this testing procedure is to sort services by pricing performance in the 
first year of the pair and group services by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  The second step is to 
compute the average pricing performance for the quantiles formed in the first year of the pair in 
the second year of the pair. For example, the pricing performance of the top fourth quantile 
formed in 1995 is computed for 1996. The third step is to compute the following differences in 
pricing performance for the top- and bottom-performing quantiles, 
  18 
(13)  ,1 ,1 ,1 tt tt tt DIFNAP TNAP BNAP +++ =−    
  
(14)  ,1 ,1 ,1 tt tt tt DIFRA TRA BRA +++ =−    
 
(15)  ,1 ,1 ,1 tt tt tt DIFr Tr Br +++ =−    
 
where  ,1 tt TNAP +  and  ,1 tt BNAP +  are the average net advisory prices for the top and bottom 
quantiles (thirds or fourths) formed in year t and tracked in year t+1, respectively,   ,1 tt TRA +  and 
,1 tt BRA +  are the average net advisory ranks for the top and bottom quantiles (thirds or fourths) 
formed in year t and tracked in year t+1, respectively,  and  ,1 tt Tr +  and  ,1 tt Br +  are the average net 
advisory returns for the top and bottom quantiles (thirds or fourths) formed in year t and tracked 
in year t+1, respectively. The fourth step is to estimate the mean and standard deviation of the 
above differences across all possible pairs of years.  Finally, the following test statistic can be 













where  j x  is the mean estimate across the possible pairs of years,  ˆ j σ  is the standard deviation 
estimate across the possible pairs of years and  ,, j DIFNAP DIFRA DIFr = .  In the case of 
overlapping crop years,  3 T =  since there are three pairs of years (1995 vs.1996, 1996 vs.1997, 
1997 vs.1998).  In the case of non-overlapping crop years,  2 T =  since there are two pairs of 
years (1995 vs.1997, 1996 vs.1998).   
 
Predictability Test Results 
 
Results of the test of predictability based on the correlation between performance 
measures of individual market advisory services across overlapping pairs of crop years are 
presented in Table 5.
14,15  Figure 3 presents a graphical illustration of the rank correlation across 
crop years for wheat.  Estimated correlation coefficients for 1995 vs. 1996 and 1996 vs. 1997 are 
near zero in absolute magnitude and insignificantly different from zero for all three performance 
measures.  In contrast, each of the three correlations estimated for 1997 vs. 1998 are relatively 
large, at about 0.80.  All three are significantly different from zero in this case. The net result is a 
small average correlation coefficient across the three pairs of years, ranging from about 0.20 to 
0.30.  These comparisons suggest some positive consistency of pricing performance in wheat 
through time. 
 
Estimated correlation coefficients and tests of significance for non-overlapping pairs of 
adjacent crop years are presented in Table 6.  The results differ sharply from those for 
overlapping years.  All six of the estimated correlations are negative.  Most striking is the large 
absolute magnitude and significance of the correlations for 1995 vs. 1997.  These correlations are  19 
statistically significant and about –0.45 in magnitude. The average correlation for the two pairs 
of non-overlapping years ranges from –0.31 to –0.36, indicating a tendency for performance 
reversal. Since the non-overlapping results tend to be in the opposite direction of the correlations 
observed for overlapping years, the correlation of performance through time appears to be quite 
fragile, in the sense of being sensitive to the nature of the comparisons.  
 
Results of the “winner” and “loser” predictability test for overlapping crop years are 
shown in Table 7.  It is worth noting that this test of predictability is not as sensitive to outliers in 
pricing performance, either positive or negative, as the previous correlation tests.  Hence, it is 
possible for the results to differ across the two sets of tests.  The winner and loser counts, 
however, follow the pattern found in the previous correlation tests.  The first two pairs of years 
(1995 vs. 1996 and 1996 vs. 1997) show there is little difference in the odds of a winner or loser 
in one period being a winner or loser in the subsequent period.  As an example, consider the 
results for 1996 and 1997.  Of the nine winners in 1996, four are winners (top half) in 1997 and 
five are losers (bottom half).  The corresponding odds ratio is 0.80, which indicates that the odds 
(4/5) of a winning service in 1996 being a winning service in 1997 are 0.80 times the odds (5/5) 
of a losing service in 1996 being a winning service in 1997.  The winner and loser counts for 
1997 vs. 1998 contrast markedly with those of the previous two pairs of year. In this case, the 
odds ratio is 81 and significantly different from one at the one-percent level.   The odds ratio 
after pooling all pairs of years over 1995-1998 is 2.38 and significantly different from one at the 
ten percent level.  The overall significance is obviously driven be the results for the 1997 vs. 
1998 comparison. Nonetheless, these comparisons suggest some positive consistency of pricing 
performance in wheat through time. 
 
Results of the winner and loser predictability test for non-overlapping crop years are 
shown in Table 8.  Significant odds ratios are not found for either of the two pairs of years or for 
the pooled total.  Mirroring the correlation results, a tendency for reversals is evident, in that 
winners are more likely to lose in the next year and vice versa.  Once again, the contrast in the 
results between overlapping and non-overlapping data highlights the sensitivity of the results to 
the nature of the comparisons. 
  
Results for the test of predictability based on the difference between pricing performance 
for “top” and “bottom” performing advisory services across overlapping pairs of adjacent crop 
years are shown in Table 9.  Nominally there is some evidence that top services outperform 
bottom services.  In both cases, the average net advisory price for services in the top quantile 
(thirds or fourths) exceeds the average net advisory price for services in the bottom quantile. This 
is most evident when comparing average prices for the top fourth and bottom fourth, with net 
prices for the top group exceeding those of the bottom group by $0.41 per bushel. However, t-
statistics indicate that neither of the positive price premiums for top performers is significantly 
different from zero, although some of the lack of significance certainly can be attributed to the 
fact that only three observations are used to compute the test statistics.  It is interesting to 
observe that the average return for all quantiles is substantially negative, indicating that 
regardless of which quantile is selected net advisory prices are less than the market benchmark.  
Top performers simply underperform the market less than bottom performers. 
  20 
Results for the test of predictability based on the difference between pricing performance 
for “top” and “bottom” performing advisory services across non-overlapping pairs of adjacent 
crop years are shown in Table 10.  These results tend to be just the opposite of those observed for 
overlapping years. In all cases, the average net advisory price for services in the top quantile 
(thirds or fourths) is below the average net advisory price for services in the bottom quantile. For 
example, net prices for the top fourth of services in wheat, on average, are $0.39 per bushel less 
than the comparable average prices for bottom fourth services.  Once again, t-statistics indicate 
that none of the negative premiums for top performers is significantly different from zero. 
Finally, it is worth noting that both the top third and top fourth quantiles generate average returns 
that are substantially negative, so these “top” services not only trail bottom performers, but also 
the market benchmark. 
 
The practical implications of the contrary top- and bottom-performer results (at least 
nominally) for overlapping versus non-overlapping years are striking.  Consider the case of a 
farmer who uses 1995 performance results to select a top-fourth advisory service.  As shown in 
Table A9 in the Appendix, the 1995 and 1996 comparisons suggest that services in the top fourth 
outperform services in the bottom fourth by $1.18 per bushel.  However, since the 1995 
marketing window ends on May 31, 1996, halfway through the 1996 marketing window and one 
day before the beginning of the 1997 marketing window, the farmer could fully implement their 
choice of advisory service only for the 1997 crop. The comparisons in Table A15 show that top-
performing advisory services in 1995 tend to be the bottom-performing services in 1997, just the 
opposite of what the farmer expected. In fact, top-fourth performing services underperform 
bottom-fourth performing services in 1997 by $0.74 per bushel. Similar results tend to be found 
for other years. 
 
  Overall, the test results presented in this section provide little evidence that future 
advisory service performance in wheat can be usefully predicted from past performance.  Most 
test results show no statistically significant predictability.  When predictability is found, it is 
sensitive to the nature of the comparisons (overlapping versus non-overlapping crop years) and 
statistical test considered. The previous conclusion does not mean it is impossible to predict 
advisory service performance. There may be other variables associated with performance that 
can be used for prediction.  For example, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) study whether mutual 
fund performance is related to characteristics of fund managers that indicate ability, knowledge 
or effort, and find that managers who attended higher-SAT undergraduate institutions generate 
systematically higher returns.  Barber and Odean (2000) examine the trading records of 
individual stock investors and report that frequent trading substantially depresses investment 
returns.  Similar factors, such as education of advisors, cash only services versus futures and 
options services, frequency of futures and options trading, or storage costs, may be useful in 




Farmers view market advisory services as a significant source of market information and 
advice in their quest to manage price risks associated with commodity marketing.  Previous 
studies only examine advisory service performance in marketing corn and soybeans.  It is not 
known whether the results generalize to other commodities with different production and  21 
consumption characteristics.  Wheat represents an interesting additional market to examine 
advisory service performance. It differs significantly from corn and soybeans with respect to the 
timing and location of production, yield growth trends, seasonality and consumption uses.  
Hence, we would expect different marketing patterns, and potentially, different results than have 
been reported for corn and soybeans. 
 
The purpose of this report is to investigate the performance of agricultural market 
advisory services in marketing wheat.  Two key performance questions are addressed: 1) Do 
market advisory services, on average, outperform an appropriate wheat market benchmark? and 
2) Do market advisory services exhibit persistence in their wheat performance from year-to-
year?  Market advisory service recommendations for wheat are available from the AgMAS 
Project for the 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 crop years.  At least 20 advisory programs are 
included for each year. While the sample of advisory services is non-random, it is constructed to 
be generally representative of the majority of advisory services available to farmers. The tests 
used to determine average performance of market advisory services and predictability of 
performance through time have been widely applied in the financial literature. 
     
Tests of pricing performance relative to a market benchmark are based on the proportion 
of programs exceeding the benchmark price and the average percentage difference between the 
net price of advisory programs and the benchmark price.  In statistical terms, the pricing 
performance test results are clear.  Not only do market advisory programs in wheat consistently 
fail to “beat the market,” their performance is significantly worse than the market.  The level of 
under-performance is striking and consistent, with the proportion of programs above market 
benchmarks for the four-year period ranging from 0.32 to 0.34.  Point estimates of the four-year 
average return relative to market benchmarks range from –9.75 to –10.48 percent.  
     
 Given the statistical results summarized above, a relevant question to ask is whether the 
pricing under-performance of advisory programs also is economically significant.  A useful 
perspective on this question is gained by examining wheat revenue per acre.  The best point 
estimate of advisory revenue return probably is the simple average across the benchmarks.  This 
“grand average” revenue return across all four crop years and three benchmarks is –10.20 
percent, which translates into advisory revenue averaging $14 per acre below benchmark 
revenue.  By any reasonable standard, this is an economically non-trivial level of under-
performance.  
 
The pricing performance results for wheat stand in sharp contrast to those reported for 
corn and soybeans.   Irwin, Good, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) analyze the pricing 
performance of corn and soybean market advisory programs tracked by the AgMAS Project over 
1995-1998.  They find that market advisory services in corn and soybeans have a “small” ability 
to “beat the market,” with combined corn and soybean revenue for the advisory programs 
averaging about $4 per acre more than benchmark revenue.  Two explanations seem plausible for 
the divergence in results across corn and soybeans and wheat.  First, the divergence may simply 
be an artifact of a relatively small sample of years, where wheat advisory performance is by 
chance unusually poor and/or corn and soybean advisory performance is unusually good.  
Second, advisory programs may be more skillfull in analyzing and forecasting corn and soybean 
prices than wheat prices.  22 
 
Three tests of predictability are used and, in general, they provide little evidence future 
advisory service performance in wheat can be usefully predicted from past performance.  The 
average correlation coefficient relating performance from one year to the next generally is 
insignificantly different from zero.  Winner and loser counts generally indicate little difference in 
the odds of a winner or loser in one period being a winner or loser in the subsequent period.  
Average pricing performance of top-performing services is insignificantly different from that of 
bottom-performing services. Finally, when predictability is found, it is sensitive to the nature of 
the comparisons (overlapping versus non-overlapping crop years) and statistical test considered. 
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1 King, Lev and Nefstad (1995) examine the corn and soybean recommendations of two market advisory services 
for a single year.  The focus of their study is not pricing performance, but a demonstration of the market accounting 
program Market Tools. Several analyses have appeared in the popular farm press. Marten (1984) examines the 
performance of six advisory services for corn and soybeans over 1981 through 1983.  Otte (1986) investigates the 
performance of three services for corn over the period 1980 through 1984.  Each of these studies indicates the 
average price generated by the services exceeds a benchmark price (e.g., selling 100 percent at harvest). More recent 
evaluations appear in Top Producer magazine (e.g., Powers, 1993).  In this case, evaluations of corn, wheat, and 
soybean recommendations from advisory services are reported on a regular basis.  Kastens and Schroeder (1996) 
examine futures trading profits based on the information reported in Top Producer for the 1988-1996 crop years.  
They find negative trading profits for wheat and positive trading profits for corn and soybeans. 
 
2 See Zulauf and Irwin (1998) for a classification and review of marketing strategy studies. 
 
3  When the AgMAS study began in 1994, DTN and FarmDayta were separate companies.  The two companies 
merged in 1996.   
 
4 This assumption subsequently is relaxed to reflect the growing importance of alternative means of electronic 
delivery of market advisory services.  Beginning in 1997, a service that meets the original two criteria and is 
available on a "real-time" basis electronically may be included in the sample.  Two examples are Utterback 
Marketing Service, which is carried on a World Wide Web site, and Ag Review, which is available via e-mail.  Both  
are for-pay subscription services. 
 
5 Progressive Ag is included in the study for the 1996, 1997, and 1998 crop years, but was not included in 1995 
because it had not yet come to the project’s attention.  Utterback Marketing Service is included in 1997 and 1998, 
but was not included in 1995 or 1996 because its marketing programs were not deemed to be clear enough to be 
followed by the AgMAS project.  Grain Field Report, Harris Weather/Elliot Advisory, North American Ag and 
Prosperous Farmer were in the study in 1995 and/or 1996, but are not included in 1997 or 1998 because they no 
longer provide specific recommendations regarding cash sales.  Agri-Edge was included in previous reports, but the 
service was discontinued during the 1997 crop year.  Ag Line by Doane hedge program for wheat was introduced 
for the 1998 crop year.  In addition, Agri-Mark, which is included in corn and soybean evaluations, is not included 
in the wheat evaluation because their recommendations are not directed towards a soft red winter wheat farmer. 
 
6 Some of the programs that are depicted as “cash-only” do in fact have some futures-related activity, due to the use 
of hedge-to-arrive contracts, basis contracts, and some use of options. 
 
7 There are a few instances where a service clearly differentiates strategies based on the availability of on-farm 
versus off-farm (commercial) storage.  In these instances, recorded recommendations reflect the off-farm storage 
strategy.   Otherwise, services do not differentiate strategies according to the availability of on-farm storage. 
 
8 These results originally are presented in Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000).  Complete details 
regarding the components of the net prices (futures and options gains and losses, net cash price, etc.) can be found in 
this report. 
 
9 Note that revenue in this case refers to revenue net of marketing costs but not production costs.  
 
10 These results are not presented due to space constraints, but are available from the authors upon request. 
 
11 Both tests of pricing performance are applied to net advisory price and revenue.  The results should be identical, 
since the tests are based on individual year computations, which are unaffected by the change in scale from net 
advisory price to revenue.  Slight differences are found due rounding of the revenues to the nearest dollar.  The 
revenue results are presented in Appendix Tables A1 and A2. 
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12 The calculation of revenue per acre ignores economies of size that may accrue to larger farms implementing the 
recommendations.  It also ignores contract "lumpiness" problems that may be significant for smaller farms. 
 
13 This comparison is not substantially affected by the exclusion of the cost of the programs.  Jirik, Good, Irwin, 
Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) report that the average cost of the programs for the 1998 crop year is $295 per 
year.  For a 1,000 acre wheat farm, this translates into an average cost of about 30 cents per acre.  Put in different 
terms, this is roughly equal to the average benchmark revenue from two acres of wheat over 1995-1998. 
 
14 Return correlations are invariant to the particular benchmark chosen to compute returns. Hence, correlations are 
presented only for 24-month benchmark returns. 
 
15 All three tests of pricing performance are applied to net advisory price and revenue.  The results should be 
identical, since the tests are based on individual year computations, which are unaffected by the change in scale 
from net advisory price to revenue.  Slight differences are found due rounding of the revenues to the nearest dollar.  
The revenue results are presented in Appendix Tables A3 through A8. 1995 1996 1997 1998 1995-1998 1995-1998
Net Net Net Net Average  Standard Deviation
Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Net Advisory of Net Advisory
Market Advisory Service Price Price Price Price Price Price
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 4.11 4.47 2.85 2.05 3.37 1.12
Ag Line by Doane (hedge) N/A N/A N/A 2.01 N/A N/A
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 
1 4.54 4.08 1.75 1.34 2.93 1.62
Ag Resource 4.21 4.94 1.34 2.13 3.16 1.70
Ag Review 4.71 3.60 1.97 2.25 3.13 1.27
Agri-Edge (cash-only) 4.01 2.98 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) 3.98 3.11 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 3.21 4.03 2.20 2.27 2.93 0.87
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 4.00 4.18 2.20 2.09 3.12 1.13
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 3.03 3.91 2.20 2.15 2.82 0.83
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 3.91 3.84 2.20 2.05 3.00 1.01
Allendale (futures only)
 2 3.32 2.95 3.09 2.65 3.00 0.28
Brock (cash-only) 3.45 3.99 3.32 2.77 3.38 0.50
Brock (hedge) 3.33 3.76 3.49 3.33 3.48 0.20
Freese-Notis 3.66 4.42 3.23 2.54 3.46 0.79
Grain Field Report 3.79 3.60 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory 4.11 3.65 N/A N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag. 4.19 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 3.94 4.09 2.87 2.40 3.33 0.82
Pro Farmer (hedge) 4.38 3.76 2.83 2.47 3.36 0.87
Progressive Ag. N/A 4.29 2.42 2.54 N/A N/A
Prosperous Farmer 3.30 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 3.34 3.85 2.98 2.62 3.20 0.53
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 3.63 3.90 3.15 2.71 3.35 0.53
Top Farmer Intelligence 3.01 3.60 2.55 2.23 2.85 0.60
Utterback Marketing Services N/A N/A 3.90 2.79 N/A N/A
Zwicker Cycle Letter 3.89 2.74 2.20 2.22 2.76 0.79
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 3.79 3.81 2.64 2.36 3.15 0.86
  Median 3.90 3.85 2.69 2.27 3.14 0.83
  Minimum 3.01 2.74 1.34 1.34 2.76 0.20
  Maximum 4.71 4.94 3.90 3.33 3.48 1.70
  Range 1.70 2.20 2.56 1.99 0.71 1.49
  Standard Deviation 0.47 0.52 0.64 0.40 0.23 N/A
Market Benchmark Prices
 24-Month Average 3.61 3.95 3.22 2.90 3.42 0.46
 20-Month Average 3.77 4.07 3.12 2.75 3.43 0.60
 16-Month Average 3.97 4.07 3.09 2.54 3.42 0.73
Table 1.  Net Advisory Prices, Wheat, 1995-1998 Crop Years
1 At the time of analysis for this report, only a preliminary 1998 net advisory price for Ag Profit by Hjort Associates was available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, 
Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete details. 
2 At the time of analysis for this report, only preliminary 1997 and 1998 net advisory prices for Allendale (futures only) were available.  See for Jirik, Good, 
Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete details.
----------$/bushel----------
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- service did not exist or was not evaluated for that crop year. Net advisory and market benchmark prices are stated on a 
harvest equivalent basis.  Average price and standard deviation over 1995-1998 is computed only
 281995-1998 1995-1998
1995 1996 1997 1998 Average Standard Deviation
Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory of Advisory
Market Advisory Service Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 185 170 185 105 161 38
Ag Line by Doane (hedge) N/A N/A N/A 103 N/A N/A
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 
1 204 155 114 68 135 58
Ag Resource 190 188 87 109 144 53
Ag Review 212 137 128 115 148 44
Agri-Edge (cash-only) 181 113 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) 179 118 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 144 153 143 116 139 16
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 180 159 143 107 147 31
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 136 149 143 110 135 17
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 176 146 143 105 143 29
Allendale (futures only) 
2 150 112 201 135 150 38
Brock (cash-only) 155 152 216 141 166 34
Brock (hedge) 150 143 227 170 173 38
Freese-Notis 165 168 210 130 168 33
Grain Field Report 171 137 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory 185 139 N/A N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag. 188 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 177 156 187 122 161 29
Pro Farmer (hedge) 197 143 184 126 163 33
Progressive Ag. N/A 163 158 129 N/A N/A
Prosperous Farmer 148 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 150 146 194 134 156 26
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 163 148 204 138 163 29
Top Farmer Intelligence 135 137 166 114 138 21
Utterback Marketing Services N/A N/A 253 142 N/A N/A
Zwicker Cycle Letter 175 104 143 113 134 32
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 171 145 171 121 151 33
  Median 176 146 175 116 149 32
  Minimum 135 104 87 68 134 16
  Maximum 212 188 253 170 173 58
  Range 77 84 166 102 39 42
  Standard Deviation 21 20 42 20 13 N/A
Market Benchmark Revenues
 24-Month Average 162 150 209 148 167 29
 20-Month Average 170 155 203 140 167 27
 16-Month Average 179 155 201 129 166 31
2 At the time of analysis for this report, only preliminary 1997 and 1998 net advisory prices for Allendale (futures only) were available.  See for Jirik, Good, 
Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete details.
---------$/acre---------
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- service did not exist or was not evaluated for that crop year. Advisory revenue for a given service is computed as an 
equally-weighted average of corn and soybean revenue per acre. Both advisory and market benchmark
Table 2.  Advisory Revenue, Wheat, 1995-1998 Crop Years
1 At the time of analysis for this report, only a preliminary 1998 net advisory price for Ag Profit by Hjort Associates was available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, 
Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete details. 
 29Number Proportion
Number of of Services of Services
Market Benchmark/ Advisory above above Two-tail
Sample Period Services Benchmark Benchmark Z-statistic p-value
24-Month Average
1995 24 16 0.67 1.63 0.10 *
1996 23 9 0.39 -1.04 0.30
1997 20 4 0.20 -2.68 0.01 ***
1998 21 1 0.05 -4.15 0.00 ***
1995-1998 88 30 0.34 -2.98 0.00 ***
20-Month Average
1995 24 14 0.58 0.82 0.41
1996 23 7 0.30 -1.88 0.06 *
1997 20 5 0.25 -2.24 0.03 **
1998 21 3 0.14 -3.27 0.00 ***
1995-1998 88 29 0.33 -3.20 0.00 ***
16-Month Average
1995 24 10 0.42 -0.82 0.41
1996 23 7 0.30 -1.88 0.06 **
1997 20 5 0.25 -2.24 0.03 **
1998 21 6 0.29 -1.96 0.05 **
1995-1998 88 28 0.32 -3.41 0.00 ***
Table 3.  Number of Market Advisory Services above Alternative Market Benchmark Prices, 
Wheat, 1995 -1998 Crop Years
Note:  Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 5% 
level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level.  
30Average 
Number of Return above
Market Benchmark/ Advisory Benchmark Standard Two-tail
Sample Period Services Price Deviation t-statistic p-value
24-Month Average
1995 24 4.23 12.47 1.66 0.11
1996 23 -4.41 14.14 -1.50 0.15
1997 20 -23.01 25.97 -3.96 0.00 ***
1998 21 -21.99 18.10 -5.57 0.00 ***
1995-1998 88 -10.48 21.25 -4.62 0.00 ***
20-Month Average
1995 24 -0.11 12.47 -0.04 0.97
1996 23 -7.41 14.14 -2.51 0.02 **
1997 20 -19.86 25.97 -3.42 0.00 ***
1998 21 -16.67 18.10 -4.22 0.00 ***
1995-1998 88 -10.46 19.39 -5.06 0.00 ***
16-Month Average
1995 24 -5.28 12.47 -2.07 0.05 ***
1996 23 -7.41 14.14 -2.51 0.02 **
1997 20 -18.89 25.97 -3.25 0.00 ***
1998 21 -8.73 18.10 -2.21 0.04 **
1995-1998 88 -9.75 18.46 -4.96 0.00 ***
Table 4.  Average Returns above Alternative Market Benchmark Prices for Market Advisory 
Services, Wheat, 1995 - 1998 Crop Years
Note:  Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 5% level, and 
one star indicates significance at the 10% level. The return for each service is computed as the continuously-
compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the benchmark price).
-----percent-----
31Correlation Measure 1995 vs. 1996 1996 vs. 1997 1997 vs. 1998
     Rank Correlation 0.16 -0.05 0.85 ***
[0.47] [0.83] [0.00]
     Net Price Correlation 0.10 -0.20 0.78 ***
[0.63] [0.39] [0.00]
     Return Correlation 0.08 -0.22 0.73 ***
[0.70] [0.35] [0.00]
Table 5.  Correlation of Market Advisory Service Performance Between Pairs of Overlapping Crop Years, 
Wheat Net Advisory Price, 1995-1998 Crop Years
Note: Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 5% level, and one star 
indicates significance at the 10% level.   Return correlations are based on the 24-month average cash price benchmark, 
with the return for each service computed as the continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of 
net advisory price to the benchmark price). Figures in brackets are two-tailed p -values.
32Correlation Measure 1995 vs. 1997 1996 vs. 1998 Average
     Rank Correlation -0.47 * -0.25 -0.36
[0.06] [0.30]
     Net Price Correlation -0.45 * -0.18 -0.32
[0.07] [0.43]
     Return Correlation -0.44 * -0.17 -0.31
[0.08] [0.47]
Table 6.  Correlation of Market Advisory Service Performance Between Pairs of Non-
Overlapping Crop Years, Wheat Net Advisory Price, 1995-1998 Crop Years
Note: Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 5% 
level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level.   Return correlations are based on the 24-
month average cash price benchmark, with the return for each service computed as the 
continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the 
benchmark price). Figures in brackets are two-tailed p -values.
33Two-tail
Year t Year t+1 Winner t+1 Loser t+1 Odds Ratio Z-statistic p-value
1995 1996 Winner t 5 6 0.69 -0.43 0.67
Loser t 6 5
1996 1997 Winner t 4 5 0.80 -0.24 0.81
Loser t 5 5
1997 1998 Winner t 9 1 81.00 2.95 0.00 ***
Loser t 1 9
Winner t 18 12 2.38 1.65 0.10 *
Loser t 12 19
Table 7.  Predictability of Market Advisory Service Performance by Winner and Loser Categories 
Between Pairs of Overlapping Crop Years, Wheat Net Advisory Price, 1995-1998 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of ranking services by pricing performance (net advisory price and 
return result in the same rankings) in the first year of the pair (e.g., t = 1995) and then forming two groups 
of programs:  "winners" are those services in the top half of the rankings and "losers" are services in the 
bottom half. Next, the same services are ranked by pricing performance for the second year of the pair 
(e.g., t+1 = 1996), and again divided into "winners" and "losers."  For a given comparison, advisory 
services must fall in one of the following categories: winner t-winner t+1, winner t-loser t+1, loser t-winner 
t+1, loser t-loser t+1.  The odds ratio is the ratio of the odds of a winning service in t being a winning 
service in t+1 to the odds of a losing service in t being a winning service in t+1. Three stars indicates 
significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 5% level, and one star indicates 





Year t Year t+1 Winner t+1 Loser t+1 Odds Ratio Z-statistic p-value
1995 1997 Winner t 3 6 0.25 -1.39 0.17
Loser t 6 3
1996 1998 Winner t 4 5 0.80 -0.24 0.81
Loser t 5 5
Winner t 7 11 0.46 -1.15 0.25
Loser t 11 8
Table 8.  Predictability of Market Advisory Service Performance by Winner and Loser Categories 
Between Pairs of Non-Overlapping Crop Years, Wheat Net Advisory Price, 1995-1998 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of ranking services by pricing performance (net advisory price and return 
result in the same rankings) in the first year of the pair (e.g., t = 1995) and then forming two groups of services:  
"winners" are those services in the top half of the rankings and "losers" are services in the bottom half. Next, the 
same services are ranked by pricing performance for the second year of the pair (e.g., t+1 = 1997), and again 
divided into "winners" and "losers."  For a given comparison, advisory services must fall in one of the following 
categories: winner t-winner t+1, winner t-loser t+1, loser t-winner t+1, loser t-loser t+1.  The odds ratio is the 
ratio of the odds of a winning service in t being a winning service in t+1 to the odds of a losing service in t being a 
winning service in t+1. Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 5% 





Performance Quantile Price Rank Return
 in Year t in year t+1 in year t+1 in year t+1
---$/bu.--- ---percent---
Top Third 3.07 8.09 -15.59
Middle Third 2.89 10.59 -21.15
Bottom Third 2.80 12.94 -25.47
  Top Third minus Bottom Third
          Average 0.27 -4.85 9.88
          t-statistic 1.02 -1.26 0.83
         Two-tail p-value 0.41 0.33 0.49
Top Fourth 3.15 7.08 -13.88
Second Fourth 2.84 10.87 -22.83
Third Fourth 2.94 10.93 -19.56
Bottom Fourth 2.74 13.64 -27.81
  Top Fourth minus Bottom Fourth
          Average 0.42 -6.56 13.92
          t-statistic 1.59 -1.94 1.13
        Two-tail  p-value 0.25 0.19 0.38
Table 9.  Predictability of Market Advisory Service Performance by Quantiles Between 
Pairs of Overlapping Crop Years, Wheat Net Advisory Price, Average for 1995 vs. 1996, 
1996 vs. 1997, and 1997 vs. 1998 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in the first 
year of the pair (e.g., t = 1995) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  Next, 
the average pricing performance for each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. 
Then, the average pricing performance of the quantiles formed in the first year is computed for 
the second year of the pair (e.g., t+1 = 1996). Return correlations are based on the 24-month 
average cash price benchmark, with the return for each service computed as the continuously-
compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the 
benchmark price). Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates 
significance at the 5% level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level. Some 
average differences of the quantiles may not equal the difference of the averages for the 
quantiles due to rounding.
36Average Average Average
Performance Quantile Price Rank Return
 in Year t in year t+2 in year t+2 in year t+2
---$/bu.--- ---percent---
Top Third 2.22 12.50 -33.73
Middle Third 2.57 8.17 -19.97
Bottom Third 2.60 8.62 -17.49
  Top Third minus Bottom Third
          Average -0.38 3.88 -16.24
          t-statistic -1.77 2.17 -1.62
         Two-tail p-value 0.33 0.27 0.35
Top Fourth 2.14 13.13 -37.84
Second Fourth 2.35 10.73 -28.28
Third Fourth 2.77 7.10 -11.24
Bottom Fourth 2.54 8.80 -19.90
  Top Fourth minus Bottom Fourth
          Average -0.39 4.33 -17.94
          t-statistic -1.14 1.62 -1.15
        Two-tail  p-value 0.46 0.35 0.46
Table 10.  Predictability of Market Advisory Service Performance by Quantiles 
Between Pairs of Non-Overlapping Crop Years, Wheat Net Advisory Price, Average for 
1995 vs. 1997 and 1996 vs. 1998 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in 
the first year of the pair (e.g., t = 1995) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds 
and fourths).  Next, the average pricing performance for each quantile is computed 
for the first year of the pair. Then, the average pricing performance of the quantiles 
formed in the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (e.g., t+2 = 
1997). Return correlations are based on the 24-month average cash price 
benchmark, with the return for each service computed as the continuously-
compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the 
benchmark price). Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars 
indicates significance at the 5% level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% 
level. Some average differences of the quantiles may not equal the difference of the 
averages for the quantiles due to rounding.
37Figure 1. A Comparison Between Deviation from Trend Yield in West Southwest Illinois Crop Reporting District 
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 38Figure 2. Comparison of the Daily Change in Prices Between the West Southwest Illinois Price Reporting District and the Western 
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 39Figure 3.  Market Advisory Service Rank, Wheat Net Advisory Price, 1995 vs. 1996, 1996 vs. 1997 and 1997 vs. 1998 Crop Years





























































Number of of Services of Services
Market Benchmark/ Advisory above above Two-tail
Sample Period Services Benchmark Benchmark Z-statistic p-value
24-Month Average
1995 24 16 0.67 23.25 1.80 *
1996 23 9 0.39 21.72 1.41
1997 20 4 0.20 17.50 1.99 ***
1998 21 1 0.05 10.50 2.00 ***
1995-1998 88 30 0.34 86.53 1.99 ***
20-Month Average
1995 24 14 0.58 23.14 1.17
1996 23 6 0.26 21.08 1.96 **
1997 20 5 0.25 18.00 1.95 **
1998 21 3 0.14 17.50 2.00 ***
1995-1998 88 28 0.32 86.43 2.00 ***
16-Month Average
1995 24 9 0.38 22.67 1.56
1996 23 6 0.26 21.08 1.96 **
1997 20 5 0.25 18.00 1.95 **
1998 21 7 0.33 19.50 1.75
1995-1998 88 27 0.31 86.37 2.00 ***
Table A1.  Number of Market Advisory Services above Alternative Market Benchmark 
Revenues, Wheat, 1995 -1998 Crop Years
Note:  Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 5% 
level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level.  
42Average 
Number of Return above
Market Benchmark/ Advisory Benchmark Standard Two-tail
Sample Period Services Revenue Deviation t-statistic p-value
24-Month Average
1995 24 4.47 12.54 1.74 0.09 *
1996 23 -4.30 14.21 -1.45 0.16
1997 20 -22.84 25.95 -3.94 0.00 ***
1998 21 -21.97 18.09 -5.57 0.00 ***
1995-1998 88 -10.34 21.30 -4.55 0.00 ***
20-Month Average
1995 24 -0.35 12.54 -0.14 0.89
1996 23 -7.58 14.21 -2.56 0.02 **
1997 20 -19.92 25.95 -3.43 0.00 ***
1998 21 -16.42 18.09 -4.16 0.00 ***
1995-1998 88 -10.52 19.35 -5.10 0.00 ***
16-Month Average
1995 24 -5.51 12.54 -2.15 0.04
1996 23 -7.58 14.21 -2.56 0.02 **
1997 20 -18.93 25.95 -3.26 0.00 ***
1998 21 -8.23 18.09 -2.09 0.05 **
1995-1998 88 -9.75 18.47 -4.95 0.00 ***
Table A2.  Average Returns above Alternative Market Benchmark Revenues for Market 
Advisory Services, Wheat, 1995 - 1998 Crop Years
Note:  Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 5% level, and 
one star indicates significance at the 10% level.  The return for each service is computed as the continuously-
compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the benchmark price).
-----percent-----
43Correlation Measure 1995 vs. 1996 1996 vs. 1997 1997 vs. 1998
     Rank Correlation 0.14 -0.07 0.85 ***
[0.51] [0.77] [0.00]
     Revenue Correlation 0.10 -0.20 0.78 ***
[0.64] [0.39] [0.00]
     Return Correlation 0.08 -0.22 0.72 ***
[0.72] [0.35] [0.00]
Table A3.  Correlation of Market Advisory Service Performance Between Pairs of Overlapping Crop 
Years, Wheat Revenue, 1995-1998 Crop Years
Note: Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 5% level, and one star 
indicates significance at the 10% level.   Return correlations are based on the 24-month average cash price benchmark, 
with the return for each service computed as the continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of 
net advisory price to the benchmark price). Figures in brackets are two-tailed p -values.
44Correlation Measure 1995 vs. 1997 1996 vs. 1998 Average
     Rank Correlation -0.46 * -0.27 -0.37
[0.07] [0.26]
     Revenue Correlation -0.45 * -0.18 -0.32
[0.07] [0.44]
     Return Correlation -0.44 * -0.17 -0.31
[0.08] [0.48]
Table A4.  Correlation of Market Advisory Service Performance Between Pairs of 
Non-Overlapping Crop Years, Wheat Revenue, 1995-1998 Crop Years
Note: Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 5% 
level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level.   Return correlations are based on the 24-
month average cash price benchmark, with the return for each service computed as the 
continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the 
benchmark price). Figures in brackets are two-tailed p -values.
45Two-tail
Year t Year t+1 Winner t+1 Loser t+1 Odds Ratio Z-statistic p-value
1995 1996 Winner t 6 5 1.44 0.43 0.67
Loser t 5 6
1996 1997 Winner t 4 5 0.80 -0.24 0.81
Loser t 5 5
1997 1998 Winner t 9 1 81.00 2.95 0.00 ***
Loser t 1 9
Winner t 19 11 3.14 2.15 0.03 **
Loser t 11 20
Table A5.  Predictability of Market Advisory Service Performance by Winner and Loser Categories 
Between Pairs of Overlapping Crop Years, Wheat Revenue, 1995-1998 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of ranking services by pricing performance (net advisory price and return result 
in the same rankings) in the first year of the pair (e.g., t  = 1995) and then forming two groups of programs:  "winners" 
are those services in the top half of the rankings and "losers" are services in the bottom half. Next, the same services 
are ranked by pricing performance for the second year of the pair (e.g., t+1  = 1996), and again divided into "winners" 
and "losers."  For a given comparison, advisory services must fall in one of the following categories: winner t -winner 
t+1 , winner t -loser t+1 , loser t -winner t+1 , loser t -loser t+1 .  The odds ratio is the ratio of the odds of a winning 
service in t  being a winning service in t+1  to the odds of a losing service in t  being a winning service in t+1 . Three 
stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 5% level, and one star indicates 





Year t Year t+1 Winner t+1 Loser t+1 Odds Ratio Z-statistic p-value
1995 1997 Winner t 3 6 0.25 -1.39 0.17
Loser t 6 3
1996 1998 Winner t 4 5 0.80 -0.24 0.81
Loser t 5 5
Winner t 7 11 0.46 -1.15 0.25
Loser t 11 8
Table A6.  Predictability of Market Advisory Service Performance by Winner and Loser Categories 
Between Pairs of Non-Overlapping Crop Years, Wheat Revenue, 1995-1998 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of ranking services by pricing performance (net advisory price and return 
result in the same rankings) in the first year of the pair (e.g., t  = 1995) and then forming two groups of services:  
"winners" are those services in the top half of the rankings and "losers" are services in the bottom half. Next, the 
same services are ranked by pricing performance for the second year of the pair (e.g., t+1  = 1997), and again 
divided into "winners" and "losers."  For a given comparison, advisory services must fall in one of the following 
categories: winner t -winner t+1 , winner t -loser t+1 , loser t -winner t+1 , loser t -loser t+1 .  The odds ratio is the 
ratio of the odds of a winning service in t  being a winning service in t+1  to the odds of a losing service in t  being a 
winning service in t+1 . Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 5% 





Performance Quantile Revenue Rank Return
 in Year t in year t+1 in year t+1 in year t+1
---$/acre--- ---percent---
Top Third 151.21 8.13 -11.69
Middle Third 140.83 11.04 -18.94
Bottom Third 141.31 12.51 -20.08
  Top Third minus Bottom Third
          Average 9.90 -4.38 8.39
          t-statistic 0.62 -1.06 0.65
         Two-tail p-value 0.60 0.40 0.58
Top Fourth 154.27 7.15 -9.98
Second Fourth 140.67 10.87 -18.89
Third Fourth 146.63 10.88 -15.65
Bottom Fourth 135.47 13.64 -23.91
  Top Fourth minus Bottom Fourth
          Average 18.80 -6.49 13.92
          t-statistic 1.40 -1.91 1.13
        Two-tail  p-value 0.30 0.20 0.37
Table A7.  Predictability of Market Advisory Service Performance by Quantiles Between 
Pairs of Overlapping Crop Years, Wheat Revenue, Average for 1995 vs. 1996, 1996 vs. 
1997 and 1997 vs. 1998 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in 
the first year of the pair (e.g., t = 1995) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds and 
fourths).  Next, the average pricing performance for each quantile is computed for the 
first year of the pair. Then, the average pricing performance of the quantiles formed in 
the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (e.g., t+1 = 1996). Return 
correlations are based on the 24-month average cash price benchmark, with the 
return for each service computed as the continuously-compounded rate of return 
(natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the benchmark price). Three 
stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 5% 
level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level. Some average differences 
of the quantiles may not equal the difference of the averages for the quantiles due to 
rounding.
48Average Average Average
Performance Quantile Revenue Rank Return
 in Year t in year t+2 in year t+2 in year t+2
---$/acre ---percent---
Top Third 128.58 12.50 -33.63
Middle Third 148.42 9.25 -21.97
Bottom Third 154.29 7.69 -15.62
  Top Third minus Bottom Third
          Average -25.70 4.81 -18.01
          t-statistic -1.96 5.61 -2.16
         Two-tail p-value 0.30 0.11 0.28
Top Fourth 123.25 13.13 -37.71
Second Fourth 137.65 10.73 -28.28
Third Fourth 163.10 7.00 -10.76
Bottom Fourth 147.60 8.90 -20.17
  Top Fourth minus Bottom Fourth
          Average -24.35 4.23 -17.53
          t-statistic -1.11 1.64 -1.14
        Two-tail  p-value 0.47 0.35 0.46
Table A8.  Predictability of Market Advisory Service Performance by Quantiles 
Between Pairs of Non-Overlapping Marketing Years, Wheat Revenue, Average for 1995 
vs. 1997 and 1996 vs. 1998 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in the first 
year of the pair (e.g., t = 1995) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  Next, 
the average pricing performance for each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. 
Then, the average pricing performance of the quantiles formed in the first year is computed 
for the second year of the pair (e.g., t+2 = 1997). Return correlations are based on the 24-
month average cash price benchmark, with the return for each service computed as the 
continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to 
the benchmark price). Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates 
significance at the 5% level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level. Some 
average differences of the quantiles may not equal the difference of the averages for the 
quantiles due to rounding.
491995 1995 1996 1996 1996
Market Advisory Service/ Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat
  Selection Strategy Price Rank Price Rank Return
---$/bu.--- ---$/bu.--- ---percent---
Ag Review 4.71 1 3.60 16 -0.28
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 4.54 2 4.08 6 12.24
Pro Farmer (hedge) 4.38 3 3.76 13 4.07
Ag Resource 4.21 4 4.94 1 31.37
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 4.11 5 4.47 2 21.37
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory 4.11 6 3.65 15 1.10
Agri-Edge (cash-only) 4.01 7 2.98 20 -19.18
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 4.00 8 4.18 4 14.66
Agri-Edge (hedge) 3.98 9 3.11 19 -14.91
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 3.94 10 4.09 5 12.48
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 3.91 11 3.84 12 6.18
Zwicker Cycle Letter 3.89 12 2.74 22 -27.57
Grain Field Report 3.79 13 3.60 17 -0.28
Freese-Notis 3.66 14 4.42 3 20.24
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 3.63 15 3.90 10 7.73
Brock (cash-only) 3.45 16 3.99 8 10.01
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 3.34 17 3.85 11 6.44
Brock (hedge) 3.33 18 3.76 14 4.07
Allendale (futures only) 3.32 19 2.95 21 -20.19
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 3.21 20 4.03 7 11.01
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 3.03 21 3.91 9 7.98
Top Farmer Intelligence 3.01 22 3.60 18 -0.28
  Top Third (#1 - #7) 4.30 4 3.93 10 7.24
  Middle Third (#8 - #14) 3.88 11 3.71 12 1.54
  Bottom Third (#15 - #22) 3.29 19 3.75 12 3.35
  Top Fourth (#1 - #5) 4.39 3 4.17 8 13.75
  Second Fourth (#6 - #10) 4.01 8 3.60 13 -1.17
  Third Fourth (#11 - #16) 3.72 14 3.75 12 2.72
  Bottom Fourth (#17 - #22) 3.21 20 3.68 13 1.50
Table A9.  Predictability of Average Price, Rank, and Return above Market Benchmark Price by 
Quantile, Wheat, 1995 vs. 1996 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in the first year of the pair 
(1995) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  Next, the average pricing performance for 
each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average pricing performance of the quantiles 
formed in the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (1996). Pricing performance measures 
(rank, price, and return) are compared only for services with track records in both years.  Returns are based 
on the 24-month average cash price benchmark, with the return for each service computed as the 
continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the benchmark 
price). 
501996 1996 1997 1997 1997
Market Advisory Service/ Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat
  Selection Strategy Price Rank Price Rank Return
---$/bu.--- ---$/bu.--- ---percent---
Ag Resource 4.94 1 1.34 19 -108.10
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 4.47 2 2.85 8 -32.64
Freese-Notis 4.42 3 3.23 3 -20.12
Progressive Ag. 4.29 4 2.42 11 -48.99
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 4.18 5 2.20 13 -58.53
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 4.09 6 2.87 7 -31.94
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 4.08 7 1.75 18 -81.41
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 4.03 8 2.20 12 -58.53
Brock (cash-only) 3.99 9 3.32 2 -17.38
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 3.91 10 2.20 14 -58.53
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 3.90 11 3.15 4 -22.63
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 3.85 12 2.98 6 -28.18
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 3.84 13 2.20 15 -58.53
Brock (hedge) 3.76 14 3.49 1 -12.38
Pro Farmer (hedge) 3.76 15 2.83 9 -33.34
Ag Review 3.60 16 1.97 17 -69.57
Top Farmer Intelligence 3.60 17 2.55 10 -43.76
Allendale (futures only) 
1 2.95 18 3.09 5 -24.55
Zwicker Cycle Letter 2.74 19 2.20 16 -58.53
  Top Third (#1 - #6) 4.40 4 2.49 10 -50.05
  Middle Third (#7 - #12) 3.96 10 2.60 9 -44.44
  Bottom Third (#13 - #19) 3.46 16 2.62 10 -42.95
  Top Fourth (#1 - #4) 4.53 3 2.46 10 -52.47
  Second Fourth (#5 - #9) 4.07 7 2.47 10 -49.56
  Third Fourth (#10 - #14) 3.85 12 2.80 8 -36.05
  Bottom Fourth (#15 - #19) 3.33 17 2.53 11 -45.95
Table A10.  Predictability of Average Price, Rank, and Return above Market Benchmark Price by 
Quantile, Wheat, 1996 vs. 1997 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in the first year of the pair 
(1996) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  Next, the average pricing performance for 
each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average pricing performance of the 
quantiles formed in the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (1997). Pricing performance 
measures (rank, price, and return) are compared only for services with track records in both years.  Returns 
are based on the 24-month average cash price benchmark, with the return for each service computed as 
the continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the 
benchmark price). 
1 At the time of analysis for this report, only a preliminary 1997 net advisory price for Allendale (futures 
only) was available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete details.
511997 1997 1998 1998 1998
Market Advisory Service/ Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat
  Selection Strategy Price Rank Price Rank Return
---$/bu.--- ---$/bu.--- ---percent---
Utterback Marketing Services 3.90 1 2.79 2 -3.87
Brock (hedge) 3.49 2 3.33 1 13.83
Brock (cash-only) 3.32 3 2.77 3 -4.59
Freese-Notis 3.23 4 2.54 7 -13.25
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 3.15 5 2.71 4 -6.78
Allendale (futures only)
 1 3.09 6 2.65 5 -9.02
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 2.98 7 2.62 6 -10.15
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 2.87 8 2.40 10 -18.92
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 2.85 9 2.05 18 -34.69
Pro Farmer (hedge) 2.83 10 2.47 9 -16.05
Top Farmer Intelligence 2.55 11 2.23 13 -26.27
Progressive Ag. 2.42 12 2.54 8 -13.25
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 2.20 13 2.27 11 -24.49
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 2.20 14 2.09 17 -32.75
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 2.20 15 2.15 15 -29.92
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 2.20 16 2.05 19 -34.69
Zwicker Cycle Letter 2.20 17 2.22 14 -26.72
Ag Review 1.97 18 2.25 12 -25.38
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates
 2 1.75 19 1.34 20 -77.20
Ag Resource 1.34 20 2.13 16 -30.86
  Top Third (#1 - #6) 3.36 4 2.80 4 -3.95
  Middle Third (#7 - #13) 2.67 10 2.37 11 -20.55
  Bottom Third (#14 - #20) 1.98 17 2.03 16 -36.79
  Top Fourth (#1 - #5) 3.42 3 2.83 3 -2.93
  Second Fourth (#6 - #10) 2.92 8 2.44 10 -17.77
  Third Fourth (#11 - #15) 2.31 13 2.26 13 -25.34
  Bottom Fourth (#16 - #20) 1.89 18 2.00 16 -38.97
Table A11.  Predictability of Average Price, Rank, and Return above Market Benchmark Price by 
Quantile, Wheat, 1997 vs. 1998 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in the first year of the 
pair (1997) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  Next, the average pricing 
performance for each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average pricing 
performance of the quantiles formed in the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (1998). 
Pricing performance measures (rank, price, and return) are compared only for services with track records 
in both years.  Returns are based on the 24-month average cash price benchmark, with the return for 
each service computed as the continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of 
net advisory price to the benchmark price). 
1 At the time of analysis for this report, only preliminary 1997 and 1998 net advisory prices for Allendale 
(futures only) were available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete 
details.
2 At the time of analysis for this report, only a preliminary 1998 net advisory price for Ag Profit by Hjort 
Associates was available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete 
details. 
521995 1996 1996
Market Advisory Service/ 1995 Revenue 1996 Revenue Revenue
  Selection Strategy Revenue Rank Revenue Rank Return
---$/acre--- ---$/acre--- ---percent---
Ag Review 212 1 137 16 -9.07
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 204 2 155 6 3.28
Pro Farmer (hedge) 197 3 143 14 -4.78
Ag Resource 190 4 188 1 22.58
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 185 5 170 2 12.52
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory 185 6 139 15 -7.62
Agri-Edge (cash-only) 181 7 113 20 -28.32
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 180 8 159 4 5.83
Agri-Edge (hedge) 179 9 118 19 -24.00
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 177 10 156 5 3.92
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 176 11 146 11 -2.70
Zwicker Cycle Letter 175 12 104 22 -36.62
Grain Field Report 171 13 137 17 -9.07
Freese-Notis 165 14 168 3 11.33
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 163 15 148 10 -1.34
Brock (cash-only) 155 16 152 8 1.32
Allendale (futures only) 150 17 112 21 -29.21
Brock (hedge) 150 18 143 13 -4.78
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 150 19 146 12 -2.70
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 144 20 153 7 1.98
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 136 21 149 9 -0.67
Top Farmer Intelligence 135 22 137 18 -9.07
  Top Third (#1 - #7) 193 4 149 11 -1.63
  Middle Third (#8 - #14) 175 11 141 12 -7.33
  Bottom Third (#15 - #22) 148 19 143 12 -5.56
  Top Fourth (#1 - #5) 198 3 159 8 4.91
  Second Fourth (#6 - #10) 180 8 137 13 -10.04
  Third Fourth (#11 - #16) 168 14 143 12 -6.18
  Bottom Fourth (#17 - #22) 144 20 140 13 -7.41
Table A12.  Predictability of Average Revenue, Rank, and Return above Market Benchmark Revenue 
by Quantile, Wheat, 1995 vs. 1996 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in the first year of the pair 
(1995) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  Next, the average pricing performance for 
each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average pricing performance of the quantiles 
formed in the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (1996). Pricing performance measures 
(rank, price, and return) are compared only for services with track records in both years.  Returns are based 
on the 24-month average cash price benchmark, with the return for each service computed as the 
continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the benchmark 
price). 
531996 1997 1997
Market Advisory Service/ 1996 Revenue 1997 Revenue Revenue
  Selection Strategy Revenue Rank Revenue Rank Return
---$/acre--- ---$/acre--- ---percent---
Ag Resource 188 1 87 19 -87.64
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 170 2 185 8 -12.20
Freese-Notis 168 3 210 3 0.48
Progressive Ag. 163 4 158 11 -27.97
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 159 5 143 13 -37.95
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 156 6 187 7 -11.12
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates  155 7 114 18 -60.61
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 153 8 143 12 -37.95
Brock (cash-only) 152 9 216 2 3.29
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 149 10 143 14 -37.95
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 148 11 204 4 -2.42
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 146 12 143 15 -37.95
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 146 13 194 6 -7.45
Brock (hedge) 143 14 227 1 8.26
Pro Farmer (hedge) 143 15 184 9 -12.74
Ag Review 137 16 128 17 -49.03
Top Farmer Intelligence 137 17 166 10 -23.03
Allendale (futures only) 
1 112 18 201 5 -3.90
Zwicker Cycle Letter 104 19 143 16 -37.95
  Top Third (#1 - #6) 167 4 162 10 -29.40
  Middle Third (#7 - #12) 151 10 161 11 -28.93
  Bottom Third (#13 - #19) 132 16 178 9 -17.98
  Top Fourth (#1 - #4) 172 3 160 10 -31.83
  Second Fourth (#5 - #9) 155 7 161 10 -28.87
  Third Fourth (#10 - #14) 146 12 182 8 -15.50
  Bottom Fourth (#15 - #19) 127 17 164 11 -25.33
Table A13.  Predictability of Average Revenue, Rank, and Return above Market Benchmark 
Revenue by Quantile, Wheat, 1996 vs. 1997 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in the first year of the pair 
(1996) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  Next, the average pricing performance for 
each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average pricing performance of the 
quantiles formed in the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (1997). Pricing performance 
measures (rank, price, and return) are compared only for services with track records in both years.  
Returns are based on the 24-month average cash price benchmark, with the return for each service 
computed as the continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory 
price to the benchmark price). 
1 At the time of analysis for this report, only a preliminary 1997 net advisory price for Allendale (futures 
only) was available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete details.
541997 1998 1998
Market Advisory Service/ 1997 Revenue 1998 Revenue Revenue
  Selection Strategy Revenue Rank Revenue Rank Return
---$/acre--- ---$/acre--- ---percent---
Utterback Marketing Services 253 1 142 2 -4.14
Brock (hedge) 227 2 170 1 13.86
Brock (cash-only) 216 3 141 3 -4.85
Freese-Notis 210 4 130 7 -12.97
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 204 5 138 4 -7.00
Allendale (futures only) 
1 201 6 135 5 -9.19
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 194 7 134 6 -9.94
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 187 8 122 10 -19.32
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 185 9 105 18 -34.33
Pro Farmer (hedge) 184 10 126 9 -16.09
Top Farmer Intelligence 166 11 114 13 -26.10
Progressive Ag. 158 12 129 8 -13.74
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 143 13 116 11 -24.36
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 143 14 107 17 -32.44
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 143 15 110 15 -29.67
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 143 16 105 19 -34.33
Zwicker Cycle Letter 143 17 113 14 -26.98
Ag Review 128 18 115 12 -25.23
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 
2 114 19 68 20 -77.77
Ag Resource 87 20 109 16 -30.59
  Top Third (#1 - #6) 219 4 143 4 -4.05
  Middle Third (#7 - #13) 174 10 121 11 -20.55
  Bottom Third (#14 - #20) 129 17 104 16 -36.71
  Top Fourth (#1 - #5) 222 3 144 3 -3.02
  Second Fourth (#6 - #10) 190 8 124 10 -17.77
  Third Fourth (#11 - #15) 151 13 115 13 -25.26
  Bottom Fourth (#16 - #20) 123 18 102 16 -38.98
Table A14.  Predictability of Average Revenue, Rank, and Return above Market Benchmark Revenue 
by Quantile, Wheat, 1997 vs. 1998 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in the first year of the pair 
(1997) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  Next, the average pricing performance for 
each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average pricing performance of the 
quantiles formed in the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (1998). Pricing performance 
measures (rank, price, and return) are compared only for services with track records in both years.  Returns 
are based on the 24-month average cash price benchmark, with the return for each service computed as 
the continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the 
benchmark price). 
1 At the time of analysis for this report, only preliminary 1997 and 1998 net advisory prices for Allendale 
(futures only) were available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete 
details.
2 At the time of analysis for this report, only a preliminary 1998 net advisory price for Ag Profit by Hjort 
Associates was available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete details. 
551995 1995 1997 1997 1997
Market Advisory Service/ Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat
  Selection Strategy Price Rank Price Rank Return
---$/bu.--- ---$/bu.--- ---percent---
Ag Review 4.71 1 1.97 16 -49.13
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates  4.54 2 1.75 17 -60.98
Pro Farmer (hedge) 4.38 3 2.83 9 -12.91
Ag Resource 4.21 4 1.34 18 -87.67
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 4.11 5 2.85 8 -12.21
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 4.00 6 2.20 12 -38.09
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 3.94 7 2.87 7 -11.51
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 3.91 8 2.20 14 -38.09
Zwicker Cycle Letter 3.89 9 2.20 15 -38.09
Freese-Notis 3.66 10 3.23 3 0.31
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 3.63 11 3.15 4 -2.20
Brock (cash-only) 3.45 12 3.32 2 3.06
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 3.34 13 2.98 6 -7.75
Brock (hedge) 3.33 14 3.49 1 8.05
Allendale (futures only) 
1 3.32 15 3.09 5 -4.12
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 3.21 16 2.20 11 -38.09
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 3.03 17 2.20 13 -38.09
Top Farmer Intelligence 3.01 18 2.55 10 -23.33
  Top Third (#1 - #6) 4.33 4 2.16 13 -43.50
  Middle Third (#7 - #12) 3.75 10 2.83 8 -14.42
  Bottom Third (#13 - #18) 3.21 16 2.75 8 -17.22
  Top Fourth (#1 - #4) 4.46 3 1.97 15 -52.67
  Second Fourth (#5 - #8) 3.99 7 2.53 10 -24.97
  Third Fourth (#9 - #13) 3.59 11 2.98 6 -8.93
  Bottom Fourth (#14 - #18) 3.18 16 2.71 8 -19.12
Table A15.  Predictability of Average Price, Rank, and Return above Market Benchmark Price by 
Quantile, Wheat, 1995 vs. 1997 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in the first year of the pair 
(1995) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  Next, the average pricing performance for 
each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average pricing performance of the 
quantiles formed in the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (1997). Pricing performance 
measures (rank, price, and return) are compared only for services with track records in both years.  Returns 
are based on the 24-month average cash price benchmark, with the return for each service computed as the 
continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the 
benchmark price). 
1 At the time of analysis for this report, only a preliminary 1997 net advisory price for Allendale (futures only) 
was available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete details.
561996 1996 1998 1998 1998
Market Advisory Service/ Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat
  Selection Strategy Price Rank Price Rank Return
---$/bu.--- ---$/bu.--- ---percent---
Ag Resource 4.94 1 2.13 15 -30.86
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 4.47 2 2.05 17 -34.69
Freese-Notis 4.42 3 2.54 6 -13.25
Progressive Ag. 4.29 4 2.54 7 -13.25
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 4.18 5 2.09 16 -32.75
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 4.09 6 2.40 9 -18.92
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates
 1 4.08 7 1.34 19 -77.20
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 4.03 8 2.27 10 -24.49
Brock (cash-only) 3.99 9 2.77 2 -4.59
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 3.91 10 2.15 14 -29.92
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 3.90 11 2.71 3 -6.78
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 3.85 12 2.62 5 -10.15
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 3.84 13 2.05 18 -34.69
Brock (hedge) 3.76 14 3.33 1 13.83
Pro Farmer (hedge) 3.76 15 2.47 8 -16.05
Ag Review 3.60 16 2.25 11 -25.38
Top Farmer Intelligence 3.60 17 2.23 12 -26.27
Allendale (futures only) 
2 2.95 18 2.65 4 -9.02
Zwicker Cycle Letter 2.74 19 2.22 13 -26.72
  Top Third (#1 - #6) 4.40 4 2.29 12 -23.96
  Middle Third (#7 - #12) 3.96 10 2.31 9 -25.52
  Bottom Third (#13 - #19) 3.46 16 2.46 10 -17.76
  Top Fourth (#1 - #4) 4.53 3 2.32 11 -23.01
  Second Fourth (#5 - #9) 4.07 7 2.17 11 -31.59
  Third Fourth (#10 - #14) 3.85 12 2.57 8 -13.54
  Bottom Fourth (#15 - #19) 3.33 17 2.36 10 -20.69
Table A16.  Predictability of Average Price, Rank, and Return above Market Benchmark Price by 
Quantile, Wheat, 1996 vs. 1998 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in the first year of the pair 
(1996) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  Next, the average pricing performance for 
each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average pricing performance of the 
quantiles formed in the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (1998). Pricing performance 
measures (rank, price, and return) are compared only for services with track records in both years.  Returns 
are based on the 24-month average cash price benchmark, with the return for each service computed as the 
continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the benchmark 
price). 
2 At the time of analysis for this report, only a preliminary 1998 net advisory price for Allendale (futures only) 
was available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete details.
1 At the time of analysis for this report, only a preliminary 1998 net advisory price for Ag Profit by Hjort 
Associates was available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete details. 
571995 1997 1997
Market Advisory Service/ 1995 Revenue 1997 Revenue Revenue
  Selection Strategy Revenue Rank Revenue Rank Return
---$/acre--- ---$/acre--- ---percent---
Ag Review 212 1 128 16 -49.03
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates  204 2 114 17 -60.61
Pro Farmer (hedge) 197 3 184 9 -12.74
Ag Resource 190 4 87 18 -87.64
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 185 5 185 8 -12.20
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 180 6 143 12 -37.95
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 177 7 187 7 -11.12
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 176 8 143 14 -37.95
Zwicker Cycle Letter 175 9 143 15 -37.95
Freese-Notis 165 10 210 3 0.48
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 163 11 204 4 -2.42
Brock (cash-only) 155 12 216 2 3.29
Allendale (futures only) 
1 150 13 201 5 -3.90
Brock (hedge) 150 14 227 1 8.26
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 150 15 194 6 -7.45
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 144 16 143 11 -37.95
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 136 17 143 13 -37.95
Top Farmer Intelligence 135 18 166 10 -23.03
  Top Third (#1 - #6) 195 4 140 13 -43.36
  Middle Third (#7 - #12) 169 10 184 8 -14.28
  Bottom Third (#13 - #18) 144 16 179 8 -17.00
  Top Fourth (#1 - #4) 201 3 128 15 -52.51
  Second Fourth (#5 - #8) 180 7 165 10 -24.80
  Third Fourth (#9 - #13) 162 11 195 6 -8.10
  Bottom Fourth (#14 - #18) 143 16 175 8 -19.62
Table A17.  Predictability of Average Revenue, Rank, and Return above Market Benchmark Revenue 
by Quantile, Wheat, 1995 vs. 1997 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in the first year of the pair 
(1995) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  Next, the average pricing performance for 
each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average pricing performance of the 
quantiles formed in the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (1997). Pricing performance 
measures (rank, price, and return) are compared only for services with track records in both years.  
Returns are based on the 24-month average cash price benchmark, with the return for each service 
computed as the continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory 
price to the benchmark price). 
1 At the time of analysis for this report, only a preliminary 1997 net advisory price for Allendale (futures 
only) was available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete details.
581996 1998 1998
Market Advisory Service/ 1996 Revenue 1998 Revenue Revenue
  Selection Strategy Revenue Rank Revenue Rank Return
---$/acre--- ---$/acre--- ---percent---
Ag Resource 188 1 109 15 -30.59
Ag Line by Doane (cash-only) 170 2 105 17 -34.33
Freese-Notis 168 3 130 6 -12.97
Progressive Ag. 163 4 129 7 -13.74
Agri-Visor Aggressive Hedge 159 5 107 16 -32.44
Pro Farmer (cash-only) 156 6 122 9 -19.32
Ag Profit by Hjort Associates 
1 155 7 68 19 -77.77
Agri-Visor Aggressive Cash 153 8 116 10 -24.36
Brock (cash-only) 152 9 141 2 -4.85
Agri-Visor Basic Cash 149 10 110 14 -29.67
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 148 11 138 3 -7.00
Agri-Visor Basic Hedge 146 12 105 18 -34.33
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 146 13 134 5 -9.94
Brock (hedge) 143 14 170 1 13.86
Pro Farmer (hedge) 143 15 126 8 -16.09
Ag Review 137 16 115 11 -25.23
Top Farmer Intelligence 137 17 114 12 -26.10
Allendale (futures only) 
2 112 18 135 4 -9.19
Zwicker Cycle Letter 104 19 113 13 -26.98
  Top Third (#1 - #6) 167 4 117 12 -23.90
  Middle Third (#7 - #12) 151 10 113 11 -29.66
  Bottom Third (#13 - #19) 132 16 130 8 -14.24
  Top Fourth (#1 - #4) 172 3 118 11 -22.90
  Second Fourth (#5 - #9) 155 7 111 11 -31.75
  Third Fourth (#10 - #14) 146 12 131 8 -13.41
  Bottom Fourth (#15 - #19) 127 17 121 10 -20.72
Table A18.  Predictability of Average Revenue, Rank, and Return above Market Benchmark Revenue 
by Quantile, Wheat, 1996 vs. 1998 Crop Years
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting services by pricing performance in the first year of the pair 
(1996) and grouping services by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  Next, the average pricing performance for 
each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average pricing performance of the 
quantiles formed in the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (1998). Pricing performance 
measures (rank, price, and return) are compared only for services with track records in both years.  Returns 
are based on the 24-month average cash price benchmark, with the return for each service computed as the 
continuously-compounded rate of return (natural logarithm of the ratio of net advisory price to the benchmark 
price). 
1 At the time of analysis for this report, only a preliminary 1998 net advisory price for Ag Profit by Hjort 
Associates was available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete details. 
2 At the time of analysis for this report, only a preliminary 1998 net advisory price for Allendale (futures only) 
was available.  See for Jirik, Good, Irwin, Jackson and Martines-Filho (2000) for complete details.
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